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Turns of Phrase 
Time for a quiz. Have you, in the last six months, prefaced 
any utterance with the expression, "I guess this isn't politi-
cally correct, but ... "? If you have not, you should probably 
award yourself a prize, though you may have to go off by 
yourself and enjoy it. I don't think your numbers are very 
large. 
As turns of phrase go, "politically correct" is probably 
slightly more meaningful than "Where's the beef?" It has 
persisted longer, though, and seems destined to occupy a 
place in popular culture for some time, though it is hard to 
predict the half life of pointless expressions. Let's see-
there was "Well, excuuuuse me!" followed by-oh, never 
mind. ·when so much of our culture is filled with phrases 
and tags and sayings and slogans and bumper stickers ready 
to slap on any number of occasions, we may perhaps be for-
given a tendency to jumble them up, or wish them all 
transferred elsewhere. 
A dislike for the adjectival and generally sneering pre-
fix "politically correct" however, has more complex roots 
than mere distaste for the vulgar. Whoever wants to lay 
claim to having originated it, we do not have to look far to 
see why it came into existence, and why it is so popular an 
expression these days. It has come to function as a kind of 
license, in fact, for sounding like the kind of person your 
mother tried hard to discourage you from being: a rude, 
selfish, opinionated, insensitive, unkind, thoughtless boor. 
Oh, didn't your mother try to keep you from being 
that, or at least from sounding like that? My mother-and 
most other people's mothers in the days I'm remember-
ing-constantly said things like, "Talk nicely to your 
cousins," "Don't point and stare at people who look odd to 
you," "If you can't say something nice , don't say anything at 
all," or "How do you think she feels, with people saying 
mean things to her? Go say something nice." Yes, I know, 
we all grew up with too much emphasis on "nice," as 
though it were the only virtue that mattered. Living now 
with the almost complete public absence of "nice," I miss 
it. 
For awhile, it seemed that the virtues of kindness and 
consideration, offered generally and not just to one's 
friends and family, were becoming more widespread. For 
awhile, it was considered bad form to tell jokes that 
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depended on what my group thought was risible in your 
group. For awhile, it looked like speaking publicly in terms 
that denigrated another person's race or gender was 
frowned upon. For awhile, people who had authority, peo-
ple who were leaders, were more cautious about saying 
stupid things about a wife's cooking, while introducing her 
husband as a great American. For awhile, journalists 
seemed to realize that mentioning the criminal's race only 
if he were a black person might not be the right way to 
behave. Publicly, we made a large effort to sound like the 
thoughtful, caring, selfless people our mothers had in 
mind. 
But the effort was too much, evidently. We were sub-
jected to strenuous insistence by some people that if a little 
sensitivity to the feelings of others was good, then more 
sensitivity would be better. And the demands produced an 
inevitable backlash, all made possible by that little term, 
"politically correct." Suddenly, it was all ok again-racial 
jokes, stupid introductions, sexual innuendo. The term 
made it possible to label and make fun of the effort to be 
just ordinarily polite, or courteous, or civil. Now that effort 
could be seen as "goody-goody," or cowardly, or-worst of 
all American curses-coerced by governmental sanction. 
The logic is dubious, but one finds it everywhere. 
Something which is good on its own merits can be made to 
look ridiculous, or even downright bad, just by saying, with 
that knowing sneer: "Oh, I guess your group is doing that 
because it's politically correct, huh?" (I add the 'huh?' 
because the tone has to be hectoring, belittling, and ironic, 
so that if one objects, the speaker can say, "I was only jok-
ing. Can't you people take a joke?") 
And some forms of speech, or some kinds of action, 
which we all know to be wrong, or hurtful, or damaging, or 
vicious, can be softened-or so we think-when prefaced 
with, "Now I know this isn't politcally correct, but ... " 
Saying the slogan allows us to give in to our worst selves, 
and to put a kind of pleasantly astringent gloss on our hurt-
ful, damaging or vicious statements. It allows us to feel that 
we are boldly running against the grain, while we are prob-
ably just giving in once again to that oldest of all turners of 
phrase, the one who prefaced his remarks by saying, "Did 
God really say .. .?" 
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Two long letters this month for Cresset readers, refer-
ring to Professor Paul Trout's article "Fahrenheit 451: The 
Temperature at Which Critics Chill" about First Amendment 
concerns in the November, 1993 Cresset. The critique is by 
Richard Maxwell, of the VU Department of English . 
Professor Maxwell is the author of a recent book about 
Dickens, Hugo and the 19th century idea of the city, and 
among his other interests, edited The Cresset during 1989. 
Though his opening sally contains the remark that interest 
in political correctness is passe, the vehemence of the argu-
ment would tend to contradict such a conclusion. 
To the Editor: 
Paul Trout's essay in the November 1993 Cresset pur-
ports to be a defense of the First Amendment. Speaking as 
someone who is also a First Amendment absolutist or close 
to it, I entreat readers to look elsewhere for an adequate pre-
sentation of the case for free speech. Eager to skewer "politi-
cal correctness"-and latching on to this cliche about three 
years late for anyone to care-Trout runs together so many 
cases of fundamentally different kinds that he makes no 
point at all. To cite two egregious moments . .. 
(1) It is unclear why not inviting William Shockley to Yale 
would be a form of censorship: do you have to ask every jack-
ass in the stable to heehaw on your podium? Why is it cen-
sorship if you decline to honor people like Shockley who are 
not only out of their depth but also out of their fields? Here 
and elsewhere, Trout fails to distinguish between censorship 
and making up a plausible speaker's list. By this standard, 
any time a magazine turns down an incompetent article, the 
author can cry censorship. (2) If, in his animadversions on 
Jerome Kern, Mr. Trout is referring to the recent Toronto 
production of Show Boat, it wasn't suppressed. I know this 
because the Chicago Tribune recently gave it a prominently-
placed review-which seems like overblown publicity rather 
than censorship: Why is Show Boat in Toronto getting cover-
age in Illinois? Furthermore, while it is true that some peo-
ple in Toronto didn't want Show Boat, and protested against 
it, Mr. Trout rather confusingly rushes to judgment by assert-
ing that this musical's "portrayal of blacks" is "sympathetic 
and honest." Does he mean that if Show Boat hadn't been 
"sympathetic and honest," censoring it would have been OK? 
Finally, and most important to my mind, is he. aware of the 
intricate te'xtual history of Show Boat, several of whose most 
"sympathetic ·arid honest" moments were cut for decades 
before being restored in a recent recording? Here as else-
where, the question of who censors what and why is a great 
deal more complex than Mr. Trout appears to realize. 
Mr. Trout appears to be an eager collector of newspa-
per clippings. I will be glad to send him a few for his files 
about an event he may well have missed, now known as the 
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Gulf War-perhaps the most extraordinary act of govern-
ment censorship and thought-control since 1980. To put the 
point another way, these "sensitive" or "radical" academics 
who seem so deplorable from Trout's perspective may well 
be right to suppose that governmental and institutional 
information control is a greater danger to the polity and to 
free speech than the combined rage of all the fat ladies in all 
the art galleries of the land. 
Mr. Trout supposes that Fahrenheit 451 has been 
neglected by academics because its message is so daring, so 
uncongenial to sheltered liberals or radicals. Let me share 
with Trout my own Ray Bradbury story, as a quick and conve-
nient way of suggesting why this novel might not elicit uni-
versal respect from readers-liberal or not. In the late sixties 
I was a student at the University of California, Riverside. 
Bradbury came to speak. He remarked soulfully to the mem-
bers of a rapt student audience that they should seek voca-
tions which they enjoyed rather than those that paid well. 
Mterwards, a student stood up and asked Bradbury if he 
were being paid to give his lecture. Bradbury admitted that 
he was; the student then suggested that Bradbury should lec-
ture for the joy of it rather than for cash. Bradbury admitted 
defeat: he announced, to some applause, that he would 
donate his lecture fee to the student body treasury. A week 
or two later, however, he wrote to the student administrator 
of the speaker series, Larry Peitzman, asking for his money. 
Peitzman refused to issue him a check. Bradbury then wrote 
a second note , beginning with the words, "You snivelling lit- · 
tie fag, I know what you're up to and I'm going to let the 
Chancellor know too." (Peitzman lisped slightly, a condition 
exacerbated a year later when he fell off a mountain in the 
Highlands of Scotland and knocked out most of his teeth.) 
Bradbury, I'm glad to say, never got his money. 
What conclusions would I draw from this sad and sor-
did tale? In Fahrenheit 451 and elsewhere, Bradbury loved to 
pose as a richly caring liberal humanist, alive to the joys and 
sorrows of this sublunary sphere, vibrating with the rhythms 
of the universe, capable of the most transcendent flights of 
imagination and the most earthy descents into a richly senso-
ry delight. Unfortunately, he was really a mean little jerk. 
This didn't always harm him as a writer; his best stories have 
a sadomasochistic punch that puts him in a league with 
Lovecraft and with Thomas Pynchon at his nastiest (I partic-
ularly love the story about the guy who has his skeleton 
removed from his body, suddenly). But it hardly qualifies 
him as the right person to drone on about the glories of 
Shakespeare et al., or to posture as an adherent of coura-
geously hard-hitting speech. Mr. Bradbury and Mr. Trout 
might both want to remember that some insults are just 
insults. They don't enrich the public sphere. They don't 
make the rest of us tougher and more vigilant. They just add 
a bit of stupidity to the world. If we put up with them, we 
should do so reluctantly, not as a way of celebrating our own 
supposed intellectual fearlessness. Were I to add a Bradbury 
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monograph to those few Mr. Trout found in the MLA 
Bibliography, I would argue that the man who called Larry 
Peitzman a sniveling little fag is also-in his literary voice, in 
his inflated, ill-conceived pretentiousness, in his furtive and 
petty desperations, so patent even from the few sentences 
that Mr. Trout actually quotes-the man who wrote 
Fahrenheit 451. 
A final, not entirely incidental thought for Mr. Trout. 
What's so trivial about writing on "masturbatory threats in 
Low German ecclesiastical polemics of the 16th century"? 
Seems like a logical, even urgent, issue for a culture con-
cerned about celibacy. Mr. Trout is so lip-smackingly eager 
to show that academics are pedants that here, and else-
where, in his essay, he rather tends to trip over his own argu-
ment. Perhaps he hopes that-despite his enticingly macho 
poses-we will forget that he too is a mere professor. 
Sincerely, 
Richard Maxwell 
Professor Trout responds: 
To the Editor: 
My argument in "Fahrenheit 451: the Temperature at 
Which Critics Chill" wasn't aboutJerome Kern or "fat 
ladies." My argument was this: academics rarely write about 
Fahrenheit 451 because they abhor the novel's depiction of 
censorship not as governmental imposition but as the result 
of all kinds of thin-skinned interest groups hell bent on 
shutting up those who "offend" them. Just how abhorrent 
Bradbury's message really is can be inferred from Richard 
Maxwell's apoplectic response. 
Of course we ought to be concerned about government 
supression of speech, especially now that the government 
itself seems to be enforcing speech-codes and sensitivity pro-
grams for thin-skinned interest groups. Recently Charles 
Krauthammer in The New Republic revealed that an FBI agent 
interrogating him about a candidate for an administrative 
post wanted to know if the person ever showed he was preju-
diced against a group based on race, ethnicity, gender, 
national origin, etc. In other words, any sexist or racist jokes 
told during those long years of friendship? Krauthammer 
writes, "That is when it occurred to me that insensitive 
speech had achieved official status as a thought crime" (see 
also Jeremy]. Stone's "PC Invades the FBI," Wall Street 
Journal, 2 November 93, A20). 
But most such governmental intrusions are con-
strained by the First Amendment. The First Amendment, 
however, does not constrain groups and individuals acting 
on their own as private citizens. And that's where the First 
Amendment is taking a real beating. 
In a recent article on censorship, Kingsley R. Browne, 
Associate Professor at Wayne State University Law School, 
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wrote, "the primary risk of censorship in our society today is 
not from a government fearful of challenge, but from majori-
ties seeking to establish an orthodoxy for all society." 
Perhaps Mr. Maxwell, a First Amendment "almost abso-
lutist," would understand the growing threat to free speech if 
he listened more carefully to people like Barbara White, 
Coordinator of the Women's Studies Program at the 
University of New Hampshire, whose words make clear just 
how contemptuously some now regard the very freedoms 
that permit them to 'voice' their contempt for free speech in 
the first place: 
The AAUP, indeed, academia itself, has traditionally been dominat-
ed by white heterosexual men and the First Amendment and 
Academic Freedom (I'll call them FAF) have traditionally protected 
the rights of white heterosexual men. Most of us are silenced by 
existing social conditions before we get the power to speak out in 
any way where FAF might protect us. So forgive us if we don't get all 
teary-eyed about FAF. Perhaps to you it's as sacrosanct as the Flag or 
the national anthem; to us strict construction of the First 
Amendment is just another yoke around our necks. 
An eccentric view? Hardly. The April 1993 issue of the 
Canadian Association of University Teachers Bulletin contains 
an article arguing that academic freedom is to be disallowed 
if it conflicts with the establishment of a "woman-friendly uni-
versity": 
[A]rguments about academic freedom are being used by some peo-
ple in the university against those who have been underrepresented 
in the universities. This must not be allowed to occur. CAUT cannot 
allow it. And individual faculty members, wearing all their hats, 
whether as members of Senates or members of faculty associations, 
cannot allow it to happen and must work to stop it. 
At a conference in March, 1993, feminist legal scholars 
gathered, as Jonathan Rauch writes, "to forge a strategy to 
overcome the reluctance of federal courts to limit First 
Amendment rights" (Wall Streetjoumal, 13 October 1993). 
Fahrenheit 451, and other dystopias, warn all of us what 
to expect when 'good people' come to believe that freedom's 
just another word that's nothing much to lose. 
Sincerely, 
Paul A. Trout 
Monatan State University 
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SUICIDE IN TRAGEDY AND IN THEOLOGY 
M ay the tragic and the Christian attitudes to suicide 
be compatible or do they necessarily conflict? I will address 
this question by comparing William Styron's Sophie's Choice 
and James Gustafson's theological reflections on suicide. 
First, however, let me briefly explain the reasons for seeing 
tragedy and suicide as intimately connected. Our involve-
ment with and response to the tragic protagonist, I submit, 
resemble our response to the person who commits suicide. 
In particular, the ethical and theological issues tragedy rais-
es are similar to the questions provoked by suicide. 
There is something tragic about every suicide. 
However, not every literary representation of suicide is a 
tragedy. Nor does every tragedy disclose the same attitude 
toward the protagonist's death as the pattern I will trace in 
Styron's novel. There are many kinds of literature ending 
in different forms of violent death, and many different 
forms of suicide represented within tragic literature. Yet 
deep affinities link the literary genre of tragedy and the 
human problem of suicide. It is remarkable, first, how 
many tragic works end in suicide. This is particularly true 
in both drama and the novel since Shakespeare. From 
Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra and Othello to such 
modern tragic protagonists as Lord Jim, Hardy's Jude, and 
John Barbour is a member of the Department of Religion at St. 
Olaf College, where he teaches primarily in the field of Religion and 
Literature, and has most recently published The Conscience of 
the Autobiographer: Ethical and Religious Dimensions of 
Autobiography with St. Martin's Press. This essay was first 
given as an address at a conference on religion and theology in 
Durham, England, and has been published this winter in a slight-
ly different form in the Bri tish journal, Literature and 
Theology. 
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Styron's Sophie, many tragedies end in the clearest form of 
suicide: a person's fully conscious and intentional choice to 
terminate his or her own life. Still more numerous, howev-
er, are the cases in which a tragic protagonist, while 
ambivalent about ending his or her life, engages in some 
highly dangerous conflict or endeavor that others would 
call "suicidal" behavior. Take, for instance, Hamlet or Moby 
Dick's Captain Aha b. Is the death of such a character a sui-
cide? 
Some scholars have argued for a narrow definition of 
suicide as a fully conscious, d irectly willed, and freely cho-
sen decision to end one's life by one's own hand. Such a 
death can be distinguished from situations in which a per-
son accepts death as a necessary price or sacrifice for 
affirming some value or ideal more essential than contin-
ued life. This definition clearly distinguishes the suicide 
from the martyr and from the reckless mountain-climber. 
Others argue for a much broader definition of suicide that 
would encompass any person's acceptance of and submis-
sion to their own death, including the person who does not 
consciously desire to die but allows himself to do so in 
given circumstances. 
L et us accept the narrower definition of suicide as 
the direct and deliberate taking of one's own life. Sophie's 
choice to die is a suicide by this definition. Yet there are 
many persons who commit suicide, and many tragic protag-
onists, whose complex motivation makes us doubt the value 
of so clear and precise a definition of what counts as sui-
cide. One analogy between tragedy and suicide is that both 
often involve a person who is highly ambivalent about 
dying. Many suicidal persons, like tragic characters, place 
themselves in situations where they are virtually certain to 
die. Yet they may warn others of their plans, or arrange to 
be discovered before they are dead, or be relieved when 
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rescued from death. Many persons who attempt suicide 
deny that their primary desire or intention is to die, insist-
ing rather that they do not wish to live without something 
essential to them, such as another person, a cause, or a 
conception of their own dignity. Yet they may inadvertently 
reveal a secret or unconscious desire for death, in forms 
ranging from simple carelessness or recklessness to socially 
commendable but extreme forms of altruism and self-sacri-
fice. The tragic protagonist's motivation and attitude 
towards death are equally complex and ambivalent. To the 
chorus or narrator in a tragedy, the protagonist's idealism 
or visionary quest may mask an obsession with self-destruc-
tion. 
The most crucial analogies between suicide and 
tragedy are ethical and theological. If morality means 
reflection on how human actions and character traits have 
intrinsic value or disvalue, and how they affect the lives of 
other people, then suicide is one of the most morally 
weighty actions calling for assessment. Suicide causes long-
lasting grief, shame, guilt, and a very high expectation of 
suicide among the survivors of the suicide. About such acts, 
and about the variety of states of mind and circumstances 
in which suicide occurs, we need to make crucial distinc-
tions which shape not only our assessments of suicides, but 
our basic orientation of dying and living. 
My first reaction to many suicides is often moral dis-
approval or condemnation. To destroy one's life seems an 
intrinsically wrong act, and the Christian tradition has long 
held that suicide is a grave sin. Yet as I learn more about 
the circumstances of a particular suicide, I usually begin to 
feel that my initial moral judgment was too simple. For I 
may learn of the desperation and pain of the suicidal per-
son, and begin to enter into the mind of someone who 
believes that death is the only way out of his or her suffer-
ing. I may come to see, too, how the act of dying may be an 
attempt to affirm some essential value, and that the suicide 
does not wish to live without this source of meaning. The 
tragic protagonist is similarly ambiguous for moral assess-
ment. A tragic character seems "one-sided" and extreme in 
insisting that some principle or ideal is so important that 
everything-including life itself-should be sacrificed for 
it. I may judge such a person to be excessive, uncompro-
mising, or arrogant in her violent assertion of will, and yet 
admire her courage and commitment to what she most 
loves. The tragic hero, like the suicide, makes a fatal deci-
sion under the press of ambiguous circumstances, the 
influence of intense passion such as rage or grief, and an 
apparent lack of alternative actions. About many suicides 
and most tragic protagonists I feel a troubling uncertainty 
and perplexity about how to assess them morally, yet at the 
same time a deep need for ethical reflection and assess-
ment. 
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Tragedy and suicide also raise similar theological 
questions. Tragedy raises issues of theodicy when we sense 
that the events that brought about the protagonist's 
destruction are multiply determined. Tragic events are pre-
cipitated not only by the hero's agency, and not only by the 
particular circumstances of his environment, but by the 
very nature of human existence: by conflicts between equal-
ly important ideals, or by the limited foresight any mortal 
can have, or by the power of the evils which finally corrupt 
or destroy the hero. Tragic theology arises when the rea-
sons for evil are traced to sources outside the human will, 
and when these sources are interpreted in relation to the 
ultimate powers which create and rule the universe. 
Tragedy suggests that the gods or God are ultimately 
responsible for evil. As Paul Ricoeur puts it, the hidden but 
implicit religious vision of tragedy is "the scandalous theol-
ogy of predestination to evil." 
While all human suffering can raise theodical ques-
tions, a person's self-destruction poses issues of theodicy in 
a vivid but ambiguous way that has much in common with 
tragedy. Suicide shares tragedy's moral and theological 
ambiguity when the responsibility for a person's self-
destruction can be traced to both human and divine 
sources. An untimely death by suicide may make us angry 
not only at the person who chooses to die, and at the soci-
ety in which she lives, but at God. Such a death may make 
us ask the classical questions about whether God lacks the 
power or the goodness to have helped the individual find a 
way to carry on. We may wonder whether the despairing 
suicide could ever be reconciled with God, and how God's 
grace can reach a person who performs what many 
Christians have described as an unforgivable sin, the rejec-
tion of God's gift of life. 
Thus there are several analogies between our interest 
and involvement in tragedy and our uncertainty and per-
plexity about how to understand persons who commit sui-
cide. In particular, the incentive for ethical and theological 
reflection provided by tragedy is remarkably similar to the 
questions provoked by suicide, focusing in each case on 
ambiguous human and divine accountability for a violent 
death. 
II 
The primary reason for Sophie's suicide is her over-
whelming sense of guilt. In the terrifying scene at the cli-
max of the novel, Sophie and her two children undergo 
the "selection" between those persons to be immediately 
murdered at Birkenau and those to be worked to death in 
the slave labor camp at Auschwitz. Sophie is confronted by 
the aptly-named S. S. doctor 'Jemand von Niemand" who, 
when he discovers she is a Christian, gives her a choice: she 
may save either her son or her daughter. Sophie chooses 
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Jan, and Eva is dragged away screaming. Eventually Sophie 
loses her son, too, in spite of her desperate attempts to per-
suade the commander of Auschwitz, Rudolf Hoess, to save 
Jan. The horror of these events, and the depths of grief felt 
by this young mother, cannot be described. To lose one's 
children under any circumstances would be enough to 
destroy many people. The demonic quality of Sophie's 
experience is that the Nazis force her to feel implicated in 
her children's deaths. Sophie feels that she has participat-
ed in their executions and that she is irredeemably guilty. 
As a direct consequence of this traumatic experience, 
Sophie first loses her faith in God, and finally her will to 
live. 
What makes Sophie's guilt tragic is its ethical ambigu-
ity. In one sense Sophie's guilt is inappropriate, misplaced, 
irrational. Surely it is the Nazis, not Sophie, who should be 
condemned for killing her children. Even as we under-
stand and feel compassion for Sophie, we must judge her 
to make a great mistake in attributing so much moral guilt 
to herself. Yet Sophie's feelings of guilt, while exaggerated, 
are not entirely erroneous. Styron carefully distinguishes 
his fictional character from the millions of Holocaust vic-
tims who had few if any choices at all. Sophie is not just a 
victim, but an active protagonist in the novel's plot. Her 
deliberate agency makes her a tragic heroine rather than 
simply a pathetic sufferer caught up in the chaos of history. 
"She had been a victim, yes, but both victim and accom-
plice, accessory-however haphazard and ambiguous and 
uncalculating her design-to mass slaughter .... And 
therein lay one (although not the only one) of the prime 
causes of her devastating guilt" (266). Sophie makes not 
only her central tragic decision on the railroad platform, 
but numerous other crucial choices: to assist her father's 
production of anti-Semitic pamphlets, not to help Wanda 
and the Polish underground either in Warsaw or in 
Auschwitz, to return to Nathan several times, and, through-
out the novel, to go on living or try to die. 
Sophie's decisions in the novel all involve profound 
ethical ambiguity. In every case she is constrained by forced 
choices in threatening circumstances, chooses the best 
course of action she can see, and is then faced with unwant-
ed or evil consequences of her decisions. Sophie recognizes 
that her own suffering and that of others was brought 
about partly by her choices, and she feels implicated in evil. 
She struggles to determine the degree of her culpability. 
On one level of her being, Sophie knows that her feelings 
of guilt are ~xcessive, extreme, and self-destructive. She 
confesses: "In some way I know I should feel no badness 
over something I done like that. I see that it was ... beyond 
my control, but it is still so terrible to wake up these many 
mornings with a memory of that, having to live with it" 
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(599). She is tempted to deny that she had any moral 
responsibility at all, for in the world of Auschwitz, "you real-
ly could not say that this person should have done a certain 
thing in a fine or noble fashion, as in the other world .... 
You have to understand it, hating it maybe but pitying it at 
the same time, because you knew how easy it was for you to 
act like an animal too" (349). Sophie resists this temptation 
to deny her responsibility; she will not be turned into an 
amoral creature. What gives Sophie her nobility and tragic 
stature is her ambiguous capacity to accept responsibility 
for her deeds, which both represents her resistance to the 
dehumanization of Auschwitz and leads to her guilt and 
suicide. 
Sophie's choice to commit suicide reveals another 
form of ambiguity when we interpret its theological mean-
ing for her. Sophie's experience in Auschwitz makes her 
believe that God has turned away from her. "I knew that 
Christ had turned His face away from me and I could no 
longer pray to Him as I did once in Cracow .... I just knew 
that only a God, only aJesus who had no pity and who no 
longer care for me could permit the people I loved to be 
killed and let me live with such guilt" (102-3). Sophie artic-
ulates the essential tragic theology: the vision of a God who 
has omnipotence-or decisive influence over human des-
tinies-but lacks the moral attributes of the Christian God. 
She does not deny the existence of God; she is estranged 
because God allowed the Holocaust to happen, and 
because Sophie believes God will not forgive her, so that 
she must go on living with her crushing burden of guilt 
and shame. 
Sophie's suicide attempts express her rage at God. 
Her earliest attempt in Sweden reveals her desire to com-
mit a blasphemous act. She confesses to Stingo that "I had 
this idea that if I killed myself in this church, it would be 
the greatest sacrilege I could ever commit" ( 499-500). For 
Sophie, suicide means aggression against God as well as 
against herself; it expresses not only self-hatred but rebel-
lion against God. Her suicide note to Stingo, the novel's 
narrator, reads as follows: 
When I woke I was feeling so terrible and in Despair about 
Nathan, bei that I mean so filled with Gilt and thoughts of Death 
it was like Ice flowing in my Blut. . . I love Nathan but now feel 
this Hate of Life and God. F- God and all his Hande Werk. And 
Life too. And even what remain of Love. 
The same burden of guilt that makes Sophie hate 
God, however, also drives her to search for God's forgive-
ness, and for a religious solution to her agony. In a para-
doxical way Sophie's suicide parallels the demonic act of 
Dr. Jemand von Nieman d. the S. S. doctor. Styron suggests 
that there was a perverted religious motivation behind this 
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man's forcing upon Sophie her terrible dilemma. "A failed 
believer seeking redemption, groping for renewed faith" 
(591). the doctor tried to inflict upon Sophie a totally 
unpardonable sin. pr. von Niemand realized that "the 
absence of sin and the absence of God were inseparably 
connected" (593), and, in his morally numb condition at 
Auschwitz, sought to jolt himself into an awareness of God 
by committing a supreme sin. 'Was it not supremely sim-
ple, then, to restore his belief in God, and at the same time 
to affirm his human capacity for evil, by committing the 
most intolerable sin that he was able to conceive? Goodness 
could come later. But first a choice" (593). Whereas von 
Niemand has so little capacity for moral guilt as to be a 
demonic figure, Sophie suffers unbearable guilt. Yet by 
means of her suicide Sophie, a lapsed Catholic, may also be 
trying to force God's hand by committing a terrible evil. 
Sophie's suicide represents, as does the S. S. doctor's 
supreme evil, an act which by defying God's moral com-
mandments may force a revelation of God to the guilty sin-
ner. 
What kind of response might a Christian make to the 
suicides of Sophie and Nathan? Styron clearly rejects any 
simple religious consolation which fails to confront fully 
the pain and suffering which precipitated these deaths. At 
the funeral of the two lovers, Stingo is nauseated by the ser-
mon of a Universalist clergyman. If this character is sup-
posed to represent Christian faith, he offers a pathetically 
trivialized and sentimentalized version of Christianity. 
However, other evidence in the novel reveals that Styron 
has a more complex attitude toward Christian faith . 
Stingo considers himself an agnostic (613) and says at 
one point that he hates the Judea-Christian God ( 463). Yet 
in spite of Stingo's rejection of the institutions of 
Christianity, and of any religious evasion of the tragedy of 
Sophie's life and death, Styron suggests that a religious 
response is necessary for Stingo to make sense of events. 
Stingo turns instinctively to the Bible when he hears of 
deep human suffering. Mter he learns of the brutal torture 
and lynching of Bobby Weed in Georgia, lines from 
Revelation recur endlessly to him: "And God shall wipe 
away all tears from their eyes. And there shall be no more 
death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any 
more pain" (86). On his way to discover the joint suicide, 
riding a bus next to a Bible-reading black woman, Stingo is 
immensely consoled by reading the Old Testament. It is 
significant, though, that after the Psalms and Ecclesiastes 
and Isaiah, the Sermon on the Mount "didn't work for me; 
the grand old Hebrew woe seemed more cathartic, so we 
went back to Job" (615). Styron suggests that, in at least 
one form of Biblical faith, events like those at the center of 
Sophie's Choice are understood as religious experience. For 
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the Biblical books Stingo reads describe the unchecked 
reign of evil, the suffering of guilt and shame, the uncer-
tainty of redemption, and bitter despair which threatens 
but does not finally extinguish hope. 
Styron might easily have used the Holocaust and its 
decisive influence on Sophie's suicide to reject the legiti-
macy of traditional monotheistic faith. But he does not. 
Stingo asserts that "the most profound statement yet made 
about Auschwitz was not a statement at all, but a response. 
The query: 'At Auschwitz, tell me, where was God?' And the 
answer: 'Where was man?'" (623) Stingo does not, like 
Ivan Karamazov, use the deaths of children to prove God's 
injustice. Instead he focuses on the sources of human evil, 
especially the psychology of the Germans who ran the con-
centration camps and of white racists in America. Stingo 
does not conclude that belief in God is henceforth absurd, 
but that "absolute evil is never extinguished from the 
world" (623). He affirms that the experience of Sophie's 
suffering and death teaches him "the only remaining-per-
haps the only bearable-truth. Let your love flow out on all 
living things." This precept, he asserts, "springs from the 
universe and is the property of God" (623). These words 
suggest Stingo's own need for religious faith, and his strug-
gle to believe. For Stingo feels, just as deeply, that 
Auschwitz threatens to destroy belief in the possibility of 
love. Auschwitz threatens hope. 
In the novel's final scene, Stingo goes to Coney 
Island, where his tears finally flow freely, in "a letting go of 
rage and sorrow for the many others who during these past 
months had battered at my mind and now demanded my 
mourning ... who were but a few of the beaten and 
butchered and betrayed and martyred children of the 
earth" (625). Mter this cathartic outpouring, Stingo sleeps, 
and awakens to a symbolic resurrection, blessing the chil-
dren who had protectively covered him with sand. A num-
ber of elements in the last few pages of the book suggest 
the possibility of finding a positive meaning and even a reli-
gious significance in the tragedy of Sophie's life and death: 
the poetry Stingo writes, his interpretation of lines by Emily 
Dickinson, his view of the significance of Sophie's dying 
while listening to Bach's cantata 'Jesu, Joy of Man's 
Desiring," and Stingo's affirmation of all the goodness and 
beauty he found in the lives of Sophie and Nathan. The 
novel makes no simple or untroubled affirmation of reli-
gious belief, but dramatizes a narrator's struggle to find 
meaning in tragedy, rather like the reflections of Ishmael 
in Molly Dick or Jack Burden in Warren's All the King's Men. 
This positive meaning is ambiguously religious; faith in 
God is neither whole-heartedly affirmed nor clearly denied, 
but only hinted at as a possibility. 
Many critics and religious thinkers have argued that 
tragedy and Christian faith are incompatible, for Christian 
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faith goes "beyond tragedy," as Reinhold Niehbur put it, in 
asserting that death and destruction are not the last word 
about human destiny. If the Christian believes that God 
works in the midst of suffering to save all persons from evil, 
then even the worst adversity or despairing death-such as 
Sophie's suicide-cannot be taken as final, as placing a per-
son beyond redemption. Belief in the immortality of the 
soul, too, is said to deprive suffering of its tragic finality. 
Therefore, it is usually argued, if the final effect of tragedy 
is a sense of the inexorable waste and doom of human 
goodness, this tragic vision is finally incompatible with the 
Christian affirmation that God supports us through all 
things and saves us from the worst evils. 
If tragedy is defined as the dramatization of ultimate 
failure and waste, then Christianity and tragedy are indeed 
incompatible. However, so stark an antithesis between trag-
ic wisdom and Christian faith impoverishes our under-
standing of both. What is at stake for literary 
understanding is considerable. Such a view ignores the 
affirmative dimensions of most tragedies, which depict not 
only catastrophe but a cathartic restoration of order or a 
narrator's struggle to find positive meaning in tragedy. A 
deeply Christian dimension of certain tragedies may be the 
author's attempt to discern possibilities of goodness and 
grace at work in all human experiences. The greatest tragic 
works offer insight into both the negativities and the affir-
mative dimensions of existence. Styron's Sophie's Choice is 
such a work. The epigraph for the novel, a quote by Andre 
Malraux, epitomizes this work's intense discernment of 
both the good and the evil possibilities of life: "I seek that 
essential region of the soul where absolute evil confronts 
brotherhood." 
Sophie's suicide raises in a profound way the question 
of God's involvement in events, without resolving this ques-
tion in a clear affirmation or denial of the legitimacy of 
religious faith. Styron implies that Christian faith may be 
authentic if it faces and responds to tragedy. Particular 
expressions of Christianity may or may not be capable of 
affirming belief in God without denying or evading evil. 
Sophie's Choice demonstrates that in a literary work religious 
faith and tragedy are not incompatible but may be deeply 
related. In the last section of this essay I will seek to show 
how, from a theological perspective, too, Christian faith 
need not preclude a profound awareness of tragedy. Again 
the problem of suicide will illuminate what is at stake in the 
debate about tragedy and religious faith . 
III 
Christian theological ethics may regard suicide in 
much the same way as the tragedian, that is, as deeply 
ambiguous both morally and theologically. Such a view of 
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suicide, while espoused by only a portion of the Christian 
tradition, has become increasingly attractive to Christian 
ethicists, and is exemplified in a striking way by the work of 
James Gustafson. 
For most of Christian history since Augustine, suicide 
has been seen as an unforgivable sin, calling for unequivo-
cal condemnation. Yet in the twentieth century theologians 
have been increasingly reluctant to morally condemn sui-
cide. Such reflections show a more profound awareness of 
the ethical ambiguity of suicide than has characterized 
much of the Christian tradition. In part this tendency 
demonstrates increasing understanding of the role of 
depression, mental illness, and possible genetic factors in 
precipitating many suicides. 
In the chapter on suicide in volume two of his Ethics 
from a Theocentric Perspective, James Gustafson speaks of sui-
cide as a tragic act, in that "the person does what is irre-
versible and irrevocable, i.e., dies, because he or she thinks 
it is the right thing to do, and has no other choice" (187). 
He criticizes judgments which focus on suicide as an isolat-
ed act, apart from a person's intentions or circumstances. 
"If ethical reflection on suicide is confined only to the act, 
and excludes the conditions in which the act appears to the 
agent to be a good or even right one, it is morally myopic if 
not blind" (212). This call to attend to the agent's perspec-
tive does not mean that Gustafson judges every suicide to 
be morally justifiable; he explains how errors of judgment 
and failures of imagination can lead to suicide. Speaking of 
the problem of misplaced guilt, for example, which I have 
held is Sophie's central mistake, Gustafson holds that this 
error often comes about from a failure to accept the limits 
and conditions of finitude: 
The error of the excessive scrupulous conscience is often 
that it assumes moral responsibility where there is no causal rela-
tionship between the person and the course of events .... The 
failure to accept the conditions of finitude can lead to misplaced 
guilt; the failure to recognize that one's own actions are only a 
small part in the ongoing processes of interaction in which many 
others exercise powers can lead to unbearable senses of responsi-
bility. (205) 
Here Gustafson criticizes the suicide's self-under-
standing, yet the tone and the intent of his analysis is not 
simply moralistic condemnation, but empathetic discern-
ment of the human needs expressed in suicide. And in 
some situations he holds that suicide may be a morally 
proper choice to which others should consent: "Suicide is 
always a tragic moral choice; it is sometimes a misguided 
choice. But it can be, I believe, a conscientious choice. Our 
first responsibility from my theocentric perspective is to 
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sustain others and the relationships which make life worth 
living; another is to restrain persons from the act if we have 
opportunity to do so; but finally we often must consent to 
its being done-justifiably, tragically, and mournfully" 
(215). Gustafson's analysis of the ethical ambiguity of sui-
cide illustrates a pronounced tendency in recent Christian 
ethics and resembles a central theme of a tragic author 
such as William Styron. 
Where Gustafson diverges from most Christian 
thinkers, however, is in his appreciation of how suicide rais-
es theological questions. His final paragraph on suicide 
suggests a tragic theology: 
If the powers of destruction that bear down upon individu-
als are insurmountable, if there is no other reasonable choice for 
them to make in the face of unbearable and unbelievable suffer-
ing, if persons are not significantly causally accountable for the 
bleakness of their Jives and the circumstances in which they live, 
and if there is nothing or almost nothing that those in whose care 
they are can do for them, there is reason to quarrel with God. Life 
is a gift, and is to be received with gratitude, but if life becomes an 
unbearable burden there is reason for enmity toward God .... 
Finally one has to consent to the reality that the powers that bring 
life into being do not always sustain it but can lead to its untimely 
and tragic destruction. (215-16) 
This passage suggests the "hostile deity," the "malevo-
lent transcendence," and the "unavowable theology" of the 
tragic vision, to use. Paul Ricoeur's terms. Although this 
view of God must be qualified by many other affirmations 
in Gustafson's two volumes, it asserts the legitimacy of the 
tragic vision as one component or aspect of Christian theol-
ogy. Gustafson's work reveals, I think, as close an approxi-
mation of tragic theology as is possible for a thinker 
working within the constraints of the Christian tradition. In 
fact, for many of his critics, Gustafson's theological vision 
would fall outside the bounds of Christian orthodoxy. If 
God is seen at work in "the powers that bear down on us," 
specifically in the forces that converge on a suicide, this 
seems to compromise the Christian affirmation that God is 
ultimately for every human being, loving and providentially 
working for the salvation of each human soul. In my view, 
Gustafson's theological vision is fully and convincingly 
Christian. Yet it lies on one extreme of the spectrum of the-
ological responses to the problem of evil, and threatens to 
compromise the affirmation of God's goodness. What are 
the limits of Christian faith's capacity to absorb the tragic 
vision? 
Tragic theology arises when the sources of evil in 
experience are traced beyond human sin, and these 
sources are interpreted in relation to God. At least four 
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constraints limit the construction of a "tragic theology." 
First, the goodness of God may be mysterious and even-at 
moments-incomprehensible, but God cannot be wicked 
or indifferent to human need, or the theologian has aban-
doned Christian faith . Second, the Christian cannot assert 
that human goodness is ultimately and eternally doomed, 
and that self-destruction is the last word about human des-
tiny. Christian beliefs about Providence and eschatology 
constrain the elaboration of a theology shaped by any trag-
ic vision which implies the unredeemable destruction and 
ultimate failure and waste of goodness. 
Third, philosophical and theological speculation on 
the world-view of tragedy often produces an ontology 
which sees reality as fragmented and doomed to self-
destructive internal conflict. Such a view conflicts with the 
Christian understanding of creation. God created a world 
whose basic unity is not fractured and whose basic good-
ness is not jeopardized by the various forms of suffering to 
which creatures are subject. There is a crucial difference 
between the Christian's necessary recognition of particular 
tragedies contingent on specific circumstances and the 
construction of a world-view which posits tragedy as a uni-
versal, inevitable, or ontologically necessary feature of 
experience. 
There is a fourth, very practical danger when tragic 
wisdom becomes articulated in speculative form as a philos-
ophy or theology: the risk of fatalism. In attempts to articu-
late conceptually tragedy's deepest implications, humans 
seem predestined to doom. The waste of goodness 
becomes not a contingent event, but an instance of a uni-
versal law. This pessimistic view leads directly to hopeless-
ness and despair. Christian faith counsels against such 
despair, and I think its hopeful theological affirmations 
should-though they clearly do not always-have practical 
implications as believers face the future. In each of these 
ways, Christian beliefs cannot easily be reconciled with the 
tragic vision. 
Nonetheless, it is necessary for Christian theology to 
incorporate the insights of the tragic, as Gustafson does 
implicitly in his discussion of suicide. For there is a con-
stant danger in Christian experience and theology of 
affirming prematurely that we are "beyond tragedy," a dan-
ger that makes Christians sometimes seem naive about evil 
or prone to gloss over the suffering of others. Gustafson's 
work is not primarily concerned with the tragic vision, but 
with criticizing anthropocentrism. However, his work is a 
good example of how Christians can appropriate the 
insights of the tragic vision. 
The problem of suicide crystallizes what is at stake in 
the discussion of tragedy and Christian belief. If we see 
every suicide-whether in literature or in life-as simply 
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morally wrong, we fail to recognize the ethical complexity 
of the deed and of the person. In Sophie's case, we would 
see only her misplaced judgment about her own guilt, only 
a wrong headed and disturbed need for self-punishment. 
We would not see how her self-destruction also grows out 
of Sophie's basic goodness of character, her deep love of 
her children, and her passionate desire for a full life. We 
would be blind to the way her suicide is related to her 
capacity and need to take responsibility for her actions, and 
to her needs for repentance, atonement, and renewed rela-
tionship with God. Even when we judge a suicide to have 
made a morally wrong choice, there is the further issue of 
how we articulate that judgment, in what tone and with 
what qualifications. Tragedy might have an educative role 
in helping Christians not only to make better moral judg-
ments, but to express them with awareness of the ambigui-
ties involved in any suicide. 
A theology with a sense of the tragic discerns not 
only the moral ambiguity of a suicide, but the theological 
ambiguity of God's relationship to human suffering. A sui-
cide may provoke questioning of God's justice and provi-
dence, and even anger and quarreling with God. These are 
significant aspects of the Christian relationship with God. 
Loss of the tragic sense makes faith blithely optimistic, and 
ignores the mysterious and fearful elements of God's rela-
tionship to human history. While some of his critics find 
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Gustafson's theocentric ethics to be not only lacking in 
concern for human welfare, but even positing an indiffer-
ent or malevolent God, I see an authentic and persuasive 
Christian piety in his description of how believers may be 
moved to trust in powers that do not always work for their 
own welfare or that of those they love. Tragic theology 
sounds much like Job in his despair and his faith: 'Though 
he slay me yet will I trust in him." In his chapter on suicide 
Gustafson unmistakably reveals a tragic sensibility as he 
explores the ethical ambiguity of this act, and reflects on 
the theological implications of the powers that bear down 
on a suicide. 
The Christian's response to suicide may in crucial 
ways resemble the insights of the tragic writer. Between the 
treatment of suicide in Sophie's Choice and Gustafson's anal-
ysis in Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective there are four sig-
nificant analogies: 1) both writers stress the ethical 
ambiguity of suicide, 2) Styron and Gustafson both trace 
the causes of suicide beyond the suicide's own will to the 
environment and finally to God, 3) both thinkers see cer-
tain forms of Christian belief as glib, superficial, and eva-
sive in denying the full reality of evil, 4) each writer 
nonetheless holds open the possibility of a monotheistic 
faith which does not shirk the tragic aspects of history. One 
may believe and trust in God while continuing to wrestle 
with the problem of how to understand God's relation to 
evil. 0 
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MITAK' OYASI': THREE LITURGICAL MEDITATIONS 
First Communion at Forty-Nine 
It is already night as we line up to go in, seventeen of 
us, men, women, an'd children. We duck the big flap and 
crawl hands and knees in line to the left into the darkness 
of the lodge. I am very aware of the pit of red-hot rocks to 
my right, forty-one of them I am told later. 
The line stops. I squat in my place. I still believe this 
will be like a sauna. I feel the frame of willow boughs and 
the rough jute backing of discarded carpet against my back 
and shoulders. The flap is closed. The darkness is opaque. I 
feel the first of several stages of panic. Suddenly the ecstatic 
song begins in a high scream. I am reminded of a wounded 
animal. The leader's voice descends, and I can now hear it 
as a song. All the others join in. The song is loud, very 
loud, in the small closed hut. The blackness makes it even 
louder. I do not know the words but I certainly hear the 
song. I do not even hear it as words, yet the singing invades 
me. 
A prayer is made to the great mystery and to Iktomi 
the spider. Four scoops of water are thrown on the rocks 
which crack and sizzle. The steam arrives too soon. It 
attacks me, assaults me. I pull away against the back of the 
lodge. Four more scoops are thrown. I cover my face with 
my hands, trying to filter the burning air, afraid of what it is 
doing to my lungs. But everyone else starts singing loudly 
again, men, women, and children. I am ashamed, thankful 
for the darkness to hide in. 
Now many long prayers begin. My skin burns, my 
knees ache. I suffer as I never have in church, here from 
pain and fear, not boredom. I hear someone praying for 
me even though they don't yet know my name. More water 
is poured. My face now feels as if it is touching a hot stove. I 
want to escape but there is no easy place to go. I believe I 
can hear my flesh cooking like steamed chicken, getting 
white and firm. I think I will die now for my blood is 
cooked and will not flow. Then I remember those all 
Tom Christenson teaches in the Department of Philosophy at 
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to honor all traditions in whose midst he has been surprised by 
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around me. They have done this before and survived it. I 
laugh at myself in my own pain. I envision my wife and chil-
dren. They look but don't seem to see me. When it is my 
turn to pray, I pray for them. 
More water is poured. Will this never end? I think it 
cannot possibly get any hotter, but it always does. The 
singing now becomes wilder. I discover myself singing too. 
I do not know the words. I do not even hear words. But the 
song, like the steam, is an invading army and I have surren-
dered. The singing stops-a long, dense silence. The lead-
er gives some signal, the flap is thrown open. A slight whiff 
of cool air reaches me. I gasp at it like a drowning man, 
afraid I won't get any more. Now the cool night air circles 
in. I breathe deeply, slowly. What gracious relie£1 
We all crawl out, stumble, then stand. The steam 
rises, made pink by the firelight, hovering over us like our 
own ghosts. I spread out my arms. I feel like swimming in 
the night. I look up. The stars are only half as far away, and 
have brought all their relatives. A ten year old child comes 
up to me, shakes my hand and congratulates me on my 
endurance. Both of us laugh out loud. Others have 
stretched out in the damp grass, I do too. There is quiet 
talking around me and some soft singing. A coyote laughs a 
few hills away. Now I know what he's laughing at. 
I dry off, get dressed. I am invited to join the family 
for supper. It is 1:10 in the morning. I accept. 
Three Dakota Hymns 
LAMENTATION 
Remember, 0 great spirit, what has become of us. 
Look on us and see what has been done to us. 
Remember us, bring us back and we will come. 
Renew us as dwellers in the land, 
Feed us with new strength and the old wisdom, 
Open our ears to the song of the elders and the hopes 
of the young, 
That we may be a sign to all peoples 
And a way of return. 
Bring us back to the great fire circle where all are 
one family. 




Overtake us, 0 great spirit and overcome us. 
Overcome us, 0 sun, blazing heat of day, 
Make us sweat and thirst and faint. 
Overcome us, 0 .great sun. 
Overcome us, 0 great wind, 
High weather-maker in the west. 
Blow our fringes straight, blow the long grasses, 
Bring the deep thunder, the lightning and rain, 
Beat the gray waves against our small boat. 
Overcome us, 0 great wind. 
Overcome us, 0 great fire, 
Red-glowing rocks of the sweat lodge, 
Open our bodies and invade us, 
Open our minds and clean us, 
Sting us 'til we cry out. 
Overcome us, 0 great fire. 
Overcome us, circling eagle, 
Laughing coyote, silent deepwater catfish, 
See us with your eyes. 
Measure us and judge our dancing and singing, 
Overcome us in the dance and song. 
Overcome us, 0 .great eagle. 
Overcome us, 0 great mother, 
Overtake your children: 
The grasses and wild sage, 
The chokeberry and the corn, 
Gopher, coiling snake and mighty bison, 
We are all your children 
Overcome us, 0 great mother. 
Overtake us, 0 great spirit and overcome us. 
THANKSGIVING 
We receive this food, 
Bread, cheese and soup, 
The work of many brothers and sisters, 
Mitak' oyasi' . 
We receive this food , 
Root, stem and fruit , 
The lives of plants, 
Mitak' oyasi'. 
We receive this food , 
Flank, breast and egg, 
The lives of animals, 
Mitak' oyasi'. 
We receive this food, 
Fresh water and salt, 
Gift of the earth, 
Mitak' oyasi'. 
We receive this food, 
Cabbage, turnip and plum, 
Work of the sun and rain, 
Mi tak' oyasi'. 
We receive this food, 
Song, story and dance, 
Gifts of the great spirit through our 
ancestors. 
Mitak' oyasi'. 
A Place to Practice Justice 
Thus says the Lord . .. 
I hate, I reject your festivals, 
Nor do I delight in your solemn assemblies. 
Even though you offer me burnt offerings 
and grain offerings 
I will not accept them; 
And I will not even look at the 
peace offerings of your fatlings. 
Take away from me the noise of your songs; 
I will not even listen to the sound of your 
harps. 
But let justice roll down like a might)• river, 
And let righteousness like an ever flowing stream. 
Amos, 5:21-24 
What is the proper business of the faithful? What is it 
we do when we do the service of God? Many of us would 
reply that the nature of such service is worship and the 
form, liturgical. The work of the pastor or priest is surely 
doing God's work and that is mainly to proclaim God's 
word and to lead in worship. But Amos reminds us that 
both proclamation and worship may be hateful to God. Not 
because the place of worship and the songs are not beauti-
ful, not because the ritual is wrongly done, but because 
they do not flow out of and into a life of justice. 
A little more than a year ago in a place where the ten-
sions between a native American tribe and its neighbors 
had reached the point of threats of violence, some of the 
wisest of the tribal leaders persuaded the tribe to hold a 
pow-wow followed by a sacred feast and to make a special 
effort to get their white neighbors to come and dance and 
celebrate a feast of reconciliation and peace. Only 20 of the 
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white neighbors came, enjoyed the dancing, then joined 
the family circle to take part as equals in the sacred com-
munal meal. Mterward short speeches of thanksgiving and 
reconciliation were offered, both by the tribal leaders and 
by the white neighbors, two of which were Christian clergy, 
one a Catholic priest, the other a Lutheran pastor. 
Mter the ceremony I cornered the two clergymen and 
said,"Now you should return the favor. Ask all these people 
to join you in your sacred feast of reconciliation and peace, 
holy communion." Without the least embarrassment they 
pointed out to me that neither of them could even share 
communion with the other, to say nothing of sharing com-
munion with these "unbaptized pagans." 
The words of Amos came to my mind and in a rush of 
emotion I spoke those opening lines: 
I hate, I reject your festivals. 
Nor do I delight in your solemn assemblies. 
Both were very shocked and finally one responded, 
"Of course, if it were up to me I would be happy to do this, 
but the congregation could have the Bishop on my case 
immediately." 
Do we not all come to God's table as sinners? Is com-
munion not the occasion for asking forgiveness and forgiv-
ing, a meal of thanksgiving and reconciliation? I believe it 
is. Then why in God's name are we not able to share it with 
other Christians and all people? Are we not saying in effect, 
'This is a private party between us and God, you have not 
been invited and are not good enough to take part?" 
This brings me to raise another question: What would 
our festivals, our assemblies, our songs and offerings look 
like if they truly flowed out of a love for justice? 
1. We would have to give up the idea that these 
things work religiously because of what we do. We should 
already know that, but often forget that we are celebrating 
something that is true apart from our ceremonies. Is this 
not, after all, the essential difference between magic and 
religion? In the eucharist we are, as the Greek word should 
tell us, giving thanksgiving for something already done-
not magically making it happen. It's because we are already 
gifted, forgiven, reconciled, that we gather to recognize 
and ourselves realize what is already the case. The ceremo-
ny is the icon of the reality, not the cause of the reality. In 
baptism we celebrate that a new son or daughter is a child 
of God. We do not by some kind of exclusive magic make 
him/ her one. The idea that a child who dies before the 
ceremony of baptism is not a child of God is heinous, 
vicious, and based on a mistake. To make the ceremony a 
requirement before one can join the family of God at the 
communal meal is just as serious. We are all children of 
God, not because of what we have done but because of 
what God has done. The ceremony is for us, to help us 
remember and realize the reality. We must once and for all 
recognize the blasphemy of selling denominational tickets 
to the meal that God has prepared. Jesus ate so as to break 
down the barriers of religious propriety. Do we dare build 
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them up again by our own exclusive patterns of eating? 
2. Our liturgy is worse than useless if it does not 
inform our practice. We, like Amos' contemporaries, are 
very good at producing excellent liturgies and rituals in 
beautiful temples accompanied by awesome trappings and 
music. We are very poor at taking anything that happens 
there into the practical world with us. This is so, I am con-
vinced, because we do not fundamentally believe that what 
is iconized in the liturgy is reality. If anything, it is a wish-
world reality for us, a kind of religious Disneyland, not con-
nected in any essential way to the real world of our work, 
home and society. If we believed the reality that the 
eucharist gives us we would realize in our weekday world 
that everything comes to us as a gift and that we are all chil-
dren of one father who is bent on the reconciliation of 
each to all. 
3. One of the functions of liturgy is to iconize reality. 
The other is to practice us in living that reality. If this is so 
where are the liturgies for the realities we confess? Where is 
the liturgy that iconizes our being stewards of the creation? 
Where is the liturgy that iconizes our calling to lives of ser-
vice, stewardship, justice, love for neighbor? Where do 
Lutherans iconize their belief in the priesthood of all 
believers? We still ordain only clergy. Why not plumbers, 
teachers, farmers, parents, managers? 
We need to take our liturgies seriously. But few of us 
do because few of our liturgies take us seriously. What is 
required is a marriage between ritual and praxis where 
both are shaped by the realities we confess: God's creative, 
sustaining and redeeming acts. 
Amos bears witness to the fact that the religious, our 
response to the word of God, is not located in some sepa-
rate slice of reality but is firmly situated in the economic, 
social, legal, political, family, and educational world; the 
world where litigation is confused for justice, where chil-
dren, the poor, and the aged are abused, where we make 
money off of other people's dire needs, where racism and 
sexism are the rule, not the exception. Amos' message is 
that the socio-political-economic world is God's world. It is 
how we work here, how we tolerate systemic injustice here, 
how we seek justice here that really matters. Only when 
that has been attended to will our rituals, ceremonies, and 
pious songs be anything but hateful to God. 
Let justice roll down like a mighty river, 
And righteousness like an ever flowing stream. 
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The Chosen 
1. The Birthright 
"And Esau said, Behold I am at the point to die, 
and what profit shall this birthright do me?" 
Even in the womb I was stronger, 
wrestling him til day broke, 
and he gripped my heel, but I was first 
to see light. So what did it matter 
feeling alone all my childhood, 
hearing our mother's voice grow softer 
when she spoke to him, our father, 
silent as always, silent as his God? 
That day after the hunt, seeing 
I could barely walk, hunger 
a wolf tearing my gut, he ran 
across the field calling Brother, 
the sun risen behind him 
so he looked a king, or god, 
on a coin's gold disk, my skin seared 
by light that cast him on the horizon. 
I expected only my due. Helping me 
to the kitchen, I heard him whisper 
Give me your birthright 
and I'll give you food, his eyes 
a priest's plying a convert. 
I smelled soup simmering over the fire, 
coals glowing raw under the crock. 
I ate, and knew a greater hunger. 
Now, wandering these fields, 
coming home after a kill, I wonder: 
was it choice, fate, a final betrayal 
that made me what I am? Sometimes 
I wish I was never born to a world 
where God's favor's won with a lie. 
Then I curse my mother and her son, 
the bitch land, and I curse the light. 
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2. The Blessing 
"And Isaac loved Esau because he did eat 
of his venison. But Rebekah loved Jacob." 
For months my body 
was a battlefield, 
and I cursed God 
for granting the miracle. 
On my day, alone, 
I squatted beside a stream-
even in pain, I knew God 
had betrayed me: a horror, 
hairy as a dog 
from head to foot. 
Then I saw the perfect white hand 
clutching at the heel, 
and cried out praises to the Lord. 
Why shouldn't the second 
receive the blessing? 
Only I could see he was God's favorite 
though I loved both my sons. 
That day of my husband's death, 
the one left to hunt 
his father's supper, 
and I told the other 
Go slaughter a goat 
and fix it for )'Our father 
and wear its pelt about your hands 
and on the nape of your neck 
and you shall get the blessing. 
Why shouldn't he? 
Was he not the chosen, 
my Jacob, my beautiful? 
by Daniel Tobin 
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3. Father and Son 
"And Abraham took the wood of the burnt offering 
and laid it on Isaac his son. . . " 
I heard my mother sobbing 
prostrate in the tent 
behind us as we made 
for the wilderness, the other boys 
gathered for their games. 
He didn't hold my hand, 
the glint in his eyes 
sharp as the blade 
sheathed beneath his robes. 
Did he think I didn't see, 
did he think I didn't know 
he'd heard that Voice? 
Ahead, the mountain 
jutted on the horizon, 
a heap of spent stones, 
jagged bone pile. 
All the way he was silent, 
leading me up the path 
like any goat or sheep. 
Then: the altar, 
dried run-offs of blood, 
wing-flaps, everything below picked clean. 
Did he think as I lay there 
the pyre a temple around me, 
his hand holding the knife to my throat, 
I would cry out? 
I sank into the stone. 
So when the blade withdrew 
and he raised me with his arms, 
weeping, crying God's praises, 
I felt nothing, being already 
the given lamb. 
Now my sons come to me 
each for his blessing; 
and they shall get their due, 
older and younger 
according to the law: 
What is God but the place of choice, 
the sharpened edge-
what happens, happens. 
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4. The Chosen 
"And jacob was left alone; and there wrestled 
a man with him until the breaking of the day. " 
My father's silence echoed like a curse 
in that house. My brother smelled of earth. 
My mother whispered You're the chosen 
in my ear, until nothing else made sense. 
In that barren place where I slept, stone 
for pillow, I watched a ladder ascend 
into heaven, gatherings of angels, 
and God above it, a pure light, calling 
Your seed will be as plentiful as the dust. 
I believed it. What else could justify 
a brother's yoke? So now these wives, 
these sons, the land that will be mine forever. 
What else is there to say: lies conquer, 
though some repent while others suffer, 
and the God we dream assumes our face 
in whose image we fashion future and past. 
To be chosen is maybe to know this 
and still find light enough to praise, 
though every moment harbors that angel 
who will one day take away your name. 
The Voice From the Ladder 
We are only angels. 
Sometimes, when light 
slants through a train of clouds, 
and wind shudders through long 
hours of night, someone will cry out 
in loneliness or grief: Lord! 
and may see us gathered there, 
and may try to hold us, 
or call others shouting 
I saw God, heard God's voice, 
and they will follow him, 
though they have no knowledge 
of our path through emptiness, 
terrible, like houses of the dead. 
An artist paints pictures, 
a poet writes poems. 
But what human image 
can rescue truth from belief? 
We are only angels, 
what do we know, 
our wings beating furiously 
against heaven's trap door? 
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REFLECTIONS AFTER A VISIT TO THE U.S. 
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL 
T he Holocaust has become part of the American 
mainstream. Once Steven Spielberg takes up the cause in 
film, then the story of the Holocaust has been moved from 
the periphery of our consciousness to the heart of 
Americana 1994. And that is exactly what has happened, 
for better or worse. The inescapable sense thrust upon the 
visitor to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum is this same 
feeling that the stories of the Holocaust have been moved 
from the periphery of American life to the center, to the 
mall in Washington D.C., next to the Bureau of Engraving 
and Printing. For the visitor who happens upon this series 
of documents, news-clippings, pictures, and stories for the 
first time, the inevitable question lurks-What is this doing 
here in the U.S. capital, in the area where other museums 
of the Smithsonian document subjects so very different 
from this one, subjects that point mostly to human achieve-
ment and struggle. This one leads the visitor down the 
path of human depravity and senseless suffering. So the 
visitor is impressed, even overwhelmed, but is still asking 
why? 
My visit was my first to this museum, but the stories, 
the documents, the clippings, the historical detail, the pic-
tures are part of my own ten year odyssey attempting to 
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James F. Moore 
understand the meaning of these events we call the 
Holocaust. I have seen these things before in countless 
books, and at Dachau, at Auschwitz, at Yad Vashem in 
Jerusalem, and other museums in London, Paris, Prague, 
Amsterdam, and Chicago . I am still overwhelmed by all 
that is displayed in these things, but I look at such muse-
ums with another eye, the view of one who wonders not 
why this museum is here in Washington, D.C., but rather 
why has it taken so long for this memorial to come here. I 
do not wonder how it is that now after all these years the 
Holocaust has become part of the American mainstream, 
but rather I have known for some time now that the 
Holocaust is one of those events that will forever be a 
reflection on the heart of America, a reflection that we are 
long overdue in coming to terms with. Let me return to 
these thoughts later, but for now I turn to reflections on 
my visit to the museum. 
I had heard Michael Berenbaum, the museum's 
director, talk about the layout and the intent of the muse-
um exhibits a year before the museum actually opened. I 
knew that certain things were done to help personalize the 
visit to the museum; the most interesting is the entry card 
that matches each visitor with a victim, someone whose per-
sonal story could be set into the more impersonal data of 
the documents. My card linked me with a Polish boy 
(Israel Kisielnicki) who lived in a small Polish village 
(Kaluszyn) prior to the forming of the ghetto in Kaluszyn 
and his death from typhus in the ghetto before 1942. The 
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few details about the boy's short life began to unfold in 
larger terms as I was led station by station through detailed 
descriptions of pre-war Poland (and other Jewish commu-
nities) and the details of the ghettoes and the camps. I 
found that effort could produce further clues about the 
fateful journey that this boy I was matched with traveled on 
his way to death. These efforts to personalize the visit to 
the museum manag.e to draw the visitor in without over-
dramatizing and emotionalizing our reaction. I was glad 
for this feature of my visit. 
But, I must say, the journey to and through the muse-
um was odd for me, an oddness that is an important 
dimension of this particular museum and this visit as com-
pared with other places I have been. This is the first muse-
um that required no special effort to find. Even Anne 
Frank's hiding place in Amsterdam is off the main, busy 
areas. The Jewish Museum in London is to be found in a 
quiet square removed from the busy tourist spots of 
London. The Holocaust memorial in Paris is under the 
road of a bridge near the cathedral of Notre Dame. It 
would be missed if one is not looking for it. The fine muse-
um and study center at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem is out of 
the city on a hill, certainly a majestic view but removed 
from the busy areas of Jerusalem. To visit the U.S. 
Memorial, I took the underground to the Smithsonian exit 
and walked a block and a half. It is located in the center of 
the tourist section of Washington, D.C. The sites in 
Europe are often located at places of the Holocaust. 
Auschwitz is found in a small city in Western Poland requir-
ing at the time several days of journey by train to finally 
reach this striking monument to death. It was, indeed, odd 
that this memorial was, unlike the others, set into tourist, 
commercial Americana. 
Because of this oddness, I did ask why it was here. I 
wondered not so much why such a museum is built but why 
it was built at that particular location. I could not help but 
think that a visitor could spend a time at the Holocaust 
museum as one stop along a string of visits to say the 
Natural History Museum, the Museum of American 
History, the Air and Space Museum. And this swing of 
museums could potentially occur one after the other with 
maybe a break for lunch. Could a tourist actually do that, 
move from this museum to another as if they are on a par, 
doing the same thing? Wouldn't there be just a little strain 
on a person's sense of perspective, on the radical, even jar-
ring clash of subject matter that would say to us that this 
can't be done? Wouldn't we look for somewhere to con-
template, to find a quiet place removed from all the rest 
just to recover from the overwhelming impact of what we 
are shown by a full visit to the Holocaust Memorial? I want-
ed just to leave the museum and leave the mall immediate-
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ly after my visit. I could not imagine staying to take in the 
other "sights" after this visit. Was I too emotional about 
this visit? Had I overreacted? I wonder. 
But this was not the only oddness about this museum. 
The other places somehow had a natural connection with 
the events being described. Auschwitz was a piece of the 
memorial, it was the symbol that confronts the visitor. 
Even the village of Oswecim is part of the experience, as 
paradoxical as the part may be. Dachau is also part of the 
history being described and the Bavarian village that is 
Dachau is a striking setting for this visit, even as it is also 
paradoxical. But this museum requires a retreat into 
another world. Somehow the visitor is made to strain to 
link the world of our capital with the world of Dachau, 
Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Teresianstadt, Treblinka. And 
that strain to connect means that the visitor comes in dis-
connected, unprepared for the world being described. 
This disconnection is an odd feeling that is made even 
stranger by the realization that our humanity cannot keep 
us disconnected. Our feelings are aroused from the very 
beginning. How can we help but be drawn in? but this is 
being drawn into a world not the same as the one we left, 
but a world almost fantastic, almost unbelievable beyond 
the suspended belief that I felt entering Auschwitz. Again, 
I wondered if I was overreacting. I don't think I was, really. 
Then, the museum is odd in its layout. The archi-
tects of this museum have done a marvelous service for the 
visitor, putting us almost immediately into a world of gray 
concrete and steel, a cold facade that further sharpens the 
contrast. There is a sense of foreboding as we walk further 
into the exhibits, a sense of being swallowed up by an evil 
place, the feeling that oozes from the buildings at 
Auschwitz. I knew that feeling; a feeling of not wanting to 
be there. A feeling of being too close to evil, of being cap-
tured and put in the same prison as so many others. It is a 
feeling that is inescapable at Auschwitz and also here in 
Washington. Even the coldness of facts and figures, of his-
torical detail, of pictures of naked bodies running in front 
of shotguns and pistols, of piles of corpses that became 
masses at every one of these locations, sites of death and 
murder begins to creep over the visitor like a trap that can-
not help but overwhelm us. This is the dark side of our 
humanity and we are connected. We know that these 
things happened in our time, in a Christian land, perpe-
trated by human beings not so different from us. This is 
the oddness that comes with any visit to a memorial to the 
Holocaust. I felt it in this memorial in Washington. I am 
sure I was not alone. 
This journey was odd in many ways, but the visit itself 
was also filled with surprises that impressed me and made 
me glad for the visit. One of those surprises came with the 
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policy of the museum to allow only groups of 20 or so into 
the main exhibits at a time. Thus, we went at our own pace 
unencumbered by crowds hoping to move closer to a dis-
play or see a film clipa little longer. This was a museum in 
which the visitor could linger and think and put together 
what they were seeing. In order to increase this sense of 
control over one's own visit, individual observing booths 
were strategically placed, especially in displaying particular-
ly upsetting material. Thus, any visitor could literally be 
alone with their thoughts and the details of that particular 
exhibit. This feature struck me as a surprising and thor-
oughly effective way to move the museum beyond the nor-
mal sense of a museum. Naturally much depends on the 
instincts of the visitor, but this place allowed me to become 
absorbed by the story and the documents. I could become 
a student, an observer, even a participant without the usual 
distractions that break the spell of all that. 
I was struck by the silence. No one talked in this 
place. No one!! This visit was not intended as a group 
experience except in the way that we could be joined by 
our feelings, our anger, our disappointment, our sympathy, 
our sorrow. And that is what did join us in this visit. There 
was no call for conversation about these things. In a way 
more surprising than I thought, this museum captures the 
sense that all of us, students of the Holocaust, have said: 
silence is the most appropriate response to this story of 
horror. But that is also true of our awe at the courage, the 
compassion of those who stood by others, those who 
reached out to help and even rescue. This set of events 
confronts the observer with all the extremes of horrid inhu-
manity and unbelievable nobility. And the faces get to me. 
Every time I look at the faces I cease being an observer. I 
thought of the Polish boy whose biography was briefly writ-
ten on my entry card, and his face became real to me. And 
what can be said that adds anything to what is seen and 
felt? So I was taken by the remarkable silence of this visit, 
saying to myself that I am pleased that at this U.S. 
Holocaust memorial there was silence as we walked the 
journey to Auschwitz. 
There was also the meaning captured between the 
displays, filling the empty spaces. At one point there were 
shoes; piles and piles of shoes that were here even though 
they were first found at Auschwitz-Birkenau. Along anoth-
er space crossing a bridge we were surrounded by the faces 
of a Jewish shtetl (this village one that no longer exists). 
These walls were covered with pictures of life from ceiling 
to floor down through the next levels. We would pass by 
again in these in-between spaces and see remnants of life 
that is no more. As we moved to the exit there was the the-
ater in which voices of survivors spoke their witness, and 
people cried both on the screen and among those watch-
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ing. These were good tears, important tears. They were a 
sign that we had made the journey, the real journey. This 
is the journey not just through the many sides of the story, 
the details and the pictures. This is the journey not merely 
through the exhibits of a museum. This was the journey 
from the detached visitor who enters from the busy activity 
of the Washington Mall to another world. We had made 
the story ours. And the more the story had become ours, 
the more we wept. Roy Eckardt has said that the one thing 
we, Jews and Christians, can do together now is to weep 
together. This final scene of the visit is a testimony to the 
truth of Eckardt's words. 
The problem with this visit is the unique way that I as 
an American experienced this journey. At the end of the 
visit I did not want to leave because I knew that to leave 
meant coming out into the city again, getting onto a train 
again. Having made the journey toward weeping with the 
survivors, I was not ready to come out into the city. And 
this is our special difficulty, we Americans that is. For we 
leave this world of the museum and return to our world, to 
the heart of Americana. And we wonder how it can fit 
together. We know, in fact, that it doesn't fit together. Try 
as we might, we know that this scene of death and hatred, 
courage and compassion was played out somewhere else. 
This is not America's story even if we know that we have 
other stories that are ours, that remind us of our bitter and 
our heroic past. Something is missing in a museum if all 
we are finally led to is the closing scene of weeping with the 
survivors. And this is the great dilemma of a museum on 
the Holocaust. This is a splendid museum, but it is none 
the less a museum. 
Two features of this place, however , give hope for 
something more. First, woven into the stories of destruc-
tion and of personal survival and courage is another story, 
the story of America and the Holocaust. That story has 
been told in a variety of ways through book and film, but to 
tell that story here in this museum was an important state-
ment to American visitors. We cannot remove our world 
from the world of Auschwitz as easily as we might think, any 
more than American leaders can remove themselves from 
the political, humanitarian issues that plague the story of 
America's involvement. We know of the isolationists who 
not only kept us from entering the war but also kept politi-
cians from making the death of Jews and others in death 
camps a political issue. Fear of what special action on the 
Jewish question might mean finally led American leaders to 
do little or nothing until it was almost too late. And we 
have come to see that much was known; we were not igno-
rant of what was happening. It was too easy to say that 
Europe was not our problem, not our story. This story of 
fear and reluctance, of standing by and doing nothing (not 
The Cresset 
even filling immigration quotas to their already set levels or 
refusing entry to Jews placed on ships in order to get rid of 
them), that story is told at our U.S. Holocaust Memorial. It 
is too simplistic to say "never again," for what we need is 
thoughtful consideration of what this means when a nation 
as powerful as ours can become frozen, paralyzed at a time 
when even some action might have meant a difference. 
Leaving the museum and coming into this land again 
meant leaving with this story, this dilemma heavy on our 
minds and sensitivities. 
There is more, though. The architects of this memo-
rial decided early ir.1 the planning that a museum could 
only be part of our nation's response. The museum is the 
public witness to the story and our story; the public com-
mitment to remember. Still, the most promising activity of 
this place is not the public exhibits but the ongoing work 
of teachers and scholars, people dedicated to the project to 
teach and keep teaching, to think the hard questions, to 
explore with thoroughness the data and documents. This, 
you see, is a learning center, a center for teaching classes 
and being taught how to teach classes. This is a center for 
research and exploration of the many dimensions of this 
event that continue to challenge us, searching for ways that 
the commitment to "never again" can actually take on reali-
ty and credibility. But this powerful memorial to the vic-
tims and survivors, the partisans and resistors and rescuers 
is not really visible to the visitor who takes this odd, surpris-
ing and transforming journey by visiting the museum. 
Even so, this work of learning and teaching, studying and 
reflecting that moves beyond the stories to connect with 
our present lives may be the most powerful memorial of all. 
We shall see. 
The continuing question plagues us as we think 
about the U.S. Holocaust Museum, why now and why this? 
A full generation after has now, long ago, moved beyond 
the actually history of the Holocaust. There are diminish-
ing traces of these events as both the survivors and the 
marks and the sites disappear. This generation is at a criti-
cal juncture of losing touch with the events and their 
meaning. Much has happened, even, that makes this gen-
eration believe that we have overcome the sins of the past. 
Perhaps it is still true that what we forget we are con-
demned to repeat, but many are confident that they are 
not what their parents or grandparents were. Believing 
that there is an implicit memory that we can trust, that 
makes us different, this generation may feel it is time to 
move on. So we ask again, why does this museum appear 
now seemingly too late for its purpose? This is not a silly 
question. It is a question worth asking not only here in 
these reflections but for each of us. 
Amid all this sense of moving on there is also some-
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thing else. This generation that now succeeds us is the heir 
to accumulated hatred and bitterness to an extent that may 
be unprecedented. Rivalries and hatreds tear at the fabric 
of almost every society, every outpost of civilization in our 
world. On the one hand we despair that we have, perhaps 
can have, learned nothing from our past. These little out-
breaks of devastation found in Somalia, Ireland, Bosnia, 
Russia, Azerbaydzhan, Israel, Germany, Poland, our own 
inner cities, South Africa are endless, quite literally. We 
are so tired of this violence that we are tempted to turn 
away to a simpler life. We leave the museum with the sense 
of wanting to cleanse ourselves, wash away the memories. 
After all, what can we do? and, of course, many of us were 
not even born then. We are not likely to find this feeling 
changing. The despair I speak of constantly lurks like the 
emptiness that survivors like Elie Wiesel or Primo Levi 
speak about as they saw Auschwitz for the first time. The 
more we hear stories of the depths of depravity and despair 
the more we feel it is hopeless, the more we think why not 
forget? Our question "Why now?" rings loudly in our ears. 
Why can't we just get away, just forget? Why can't we just 
get on with things? Except that it is a fantasy we hold onto 
that we can get away, that we can forget. Our whys are an 
inner plea that tears at our hearts and even measures our 
heart. Our act of courage today is not to look at the past 
but to allow the past to challenge us to look at our own 
world,to hope for a future, something we so desperately 
want not to do. 
But these stories are not the only ones to tell. In fact, 
as important as they are to tell, they may be the least impor-
tant to tell. A visit to the horrors of the Holocaust shock-
ingly confronts us with other tales, tales of courage, of 
dogged humaneness, of people risking themselves, often 
on the spur of the moment without even an acquaintance 
with those being helped. Eliezer Berkovitz has said that 
this hell on earth became the place where both the depths 
of human depravity and the heights of human nobility are 
revealed. He is right. Auschwitz is the answer to our 
despair because we are finally not left alone with the hor-
rors. We are restored by the courage of those who would 
not give in, would not be defeated. We are able to find by 
confronting the whole story that our hearts are-our heart 
is-restored. And again we are amazed into silence, except 
that we know that these stories must be told, all of them in 
order to sense the full range of despair and hope. We 
need this, our generation so burdened with the frightful 
face of our world. We need more than the mundane of life 
that allows a failed escape, that only repeats the naivete of 
our past. We need the U.S. Holocaust Memorial as a sign 
of our American heart, a challenge to find our collective 
courage. 0 
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A Hiding Place in Hell 
Fredrick Barton 
In d efiant pre pa ra tion for his 
campaign to murder all the world's 
J ews, Adolph Hitler sa id, "After all , 
who remembers today the Turks' 
extermination of the Armenians?" As 
destruction of the infamous Podgorze 
ghe tto in Kra kow b egins in Steven 
Spielberg's devastating Schindler's List, 
a Nazi commander sneers at the half-
millenium of prosperity Jews have 
enjoyed in Poland by saying, "After 
today, it never happen ed." The world 
didn ' t learn the lesson of the Turkish 
Fredrick Barton is Prof essor of English and 
Associate Dean of Liberal Arts at the University 
of New Orleans. He is film editor and columnist 
for the newsweekly Gambit and author of the 
novels Th e El Cholo Feeling Passes, 
Courting Pandemonium, and the current 
With Extreme Prejudice (Villard/ Random 
H ouse) which was recently purchased for reading 
by President Bill Clinton. Professor Barton's 
1993 contributions to The Cresset were "Praise 
and Blame" in April and "Family Films" in 
Novnnber. 
22 
murder of two million Armenians and Oskar Schindler (Liam Neeson) 
thus allowed the Nazi murder of six 
million Jews. The sick among us now, 
whether they are the dupes of a 
Klansman like David Duke or the fol-
lowers of a black racist like the Nation 
of Islam's Khalid Abdul Muhammad, 
try to deny the fact of the Holocaust. 
In paranoid frenzy such anti-Semites 
maintain that the story of the 
Holocaust is a plot by Zionists to cam-
ouflage Jewish sins, curry undeserved 
favor in the court of world opinion 
and thereby enhance the power of 
Jews across the globe. We might wish 
to dismiss such vicious nonsense as 
the propagandist ramblings of a 
insignificant fringe. But we dare not. 
Neo-Nazism is on the rise in Germany. 
And surveys among today's American 
schoolchildren indicate a frightfully 
widespread ignorance about Hitler's 
policy of murder. 
In a world which must forever 
muster the will to stand against it, the 
memory of evil is crucial. Already it 
seems we are steeling ourselves to for-
get current events in Bosnia. But 
there as elsewhere, evil exists. Men 
have believed and continue to con-
vince themselves that genocide is justi-
fied. That's why Schindler's List is so 
important; it is history for the masses. 
It makes immediate and tangible that 
which has so soon grown distant and 
in some minds debatable. Schindler 's 
List isn'tjust the film of the year. It's a 
film for the ages. 
Based on the non-fiction novel by 
Thomas Keneally and adapted for the 
screen by Steven Zaillian, Schindler's 
List is the true story of a handful of 
Jews who miraculously survived the 
Holocaust and of one strange and 
complicated German man from the 
Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia who 
defied the policies of an entire nation 
in the midst of a homicidal rampage. 
arrives in Krakow shortly after the 
Nazi victory in the fall of 1939. An 
inveterate gambler and shameless flat-
terer, Schindler has already joined the 
Nazi party in hopes of boosting his 
business connections . In Krakow , 
Schindler converts his meager 
resources into a fine suit of clothes, a 
gold Nazi pin and a small wad of cash. 
Then, armed mostly with audacity, he 
sets out to hustle himself an 
entrepreneurial career. By night he 
frequents the city's nightclubs, buying 
drinks and otherwise befriending Nazi 
officers. By day he leverages invest-
ments from Jews who are already 
being packed into the sixteen square 
blocks of Podgorze. Soon he's in posi-
tion to bid for rights to a dormant 
enamelware factory and to exploit his 
Nazi connections for lucrative con-
tracts as a military supplier. Schindler 
turns management of his company 
over to a savvy Jewish accountant 
named Itzhak Stern (Ben Kingsley) 
and, employing unpaidJewish workers 
for whom he's charged only a user fee 
by the S.S., Schindler quickly begins to 
amass a fortune. 
The Oskar Schindler we meet in 
the film's opening passages is hardly 
admirable. He's unprincipled and self-
absorbed. He's a hard drinker and a 
shameless womanizer. He cares for 
nothing, it seems, save the pursuit of 
pleasure and his own chance for rich-
es. He seems to suffer no pangs of 
guilt, for instance, when he tak es 
occupation of a luxurious home from 
which aJewish family has been brutal-
ly evicted. Even at this stage, however, 
Schindler is different from the Nazi 
officers he spends so much time 
courting. There's no malice in him. 
He's more than a bit blind to the 
inherent evil of the Nazis, but he 
doesn't suffer from th eir racist dis-
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ease. He drives a hard bargain with 
those Jews he recruits as investors, but 
he still treats them as men. He 
forthrightly takes advantage of their 
desperate circumstances, but he 
doesn't degrade them. This lack of 
racism is the crack in Schindler's self-
ishness which Stern exploits to turn a 
Polish enamelware factory and its 
Czechoslovakian armaments successor 
into shelters where nearly 1,200 souls 
manage to ride out the Holocaust's 
bloody storm. 
Spielberg pointedly contrasts 
Schindler's character with that of 
Amon Goeth (Ralph Fiennes), com-
mandant of the slave camp at Plaszow. 
Goeth is a psychopath whose tortured 
intellect would be laughable if the 
man weren't so deadly. Goeth shares 
with Schindler a love of pretty women, 
rich food and fine liquor. He's ami-
able enough a dinner and drinking 
companion that Schindler fails to see 
his true nature for far too long. 
Goeth's devotion to the Nazi gospel is 
so devout that he tells a pretty Jewish 
girl to whom he's paid a compliment, 
"Of course, I realize you're not a per-
son, in the strictest sense of the word." 
Goeth is possessed of such polite 
social niceties as to warn his Jewish 
housekeeper not to stand too close 
because he doesn't want to give her 
his cold. But then in another moment 
he can murder the innocent with the 
same yawning detachment he might 
employ in the swatting of an insect. 
Goeth is like the lynch mob leader 
McLendon in William Faulkner's "Dry 
September" who rallies his townspeo-
ple to murder with the cry "Are you 
going to let the black sons get away 
with it until one really does it?" Goeth 
is annoyed when a pretty female 
Jewish engineer informs him of con-
struction flaws in the building of the 
slave camp and has her shot for impu-
dence. Then with a shrug immediately 
thereafter, he orders that the dead 
engineer's design corrections be insti-
tuted. Once the Plaszow camp is com-
pleted Goeth often strolls out on his 
balcony after breakfast, and in a rou-
tine as reflexive as that of stretching 
and scratching himself, randomly 
shoots Jewish laborers for committing 
the sin of falling into his gun sights at 
a moment when his trigger finger itch-
es. Among the horrors this film makes 
commonplace is the way in which the 
Jews at Plaszow gradually become 
hardened to Goeth's morning rifle fire 
as an unavoidable condition of the 
dawning day. 
When Schindler witnesses the liq-
German Industrialist Oska-r Schindle-r (Limn Neeson) welcomPs his wo-rke-rs to the safety of his nnv factory' at Brinnlitz. Photo !Jy David James 
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uidation of Podgorze, his attitude 
toward the Nazis changes, almost, it 
seems, against his own wishes. 
Schindler loves the luxury that his 
money has provided him. He cares lit-
tle for either the product or the man-
agement of his factory and initially 
suffers only embarrassment when his 
Jewish workers try to . thank him for sav-
ing their lives. Schindler's evolution is 
gradual. Early on he feels great 
warmth only toward Ste~n (who is 
understandably slow to return it), but 
with time he comes to feel connected 
to many of the people who work for 
him. Once he realizes that the Nazis 
aren't planning just to discriminate 
againstJews but actually kill them all, 
he strives to frustrate their plans, first 
by arranging employment for as many 
Jews as possible, far more than he 
actually needs to run his factories, 
finally exhausting his fortune in brib-
ing Gaeth for the opportunity to pro-
vide sanctuary at an armaments plant 
in Czechoslovakia for a list of 1,200 
people. 
The space available to me here is 
not adequate for detailing all the 
praise I feel this film deserves. Acclaim 
is due to author Keneally who assem-
bled the individual stories which give 
a human face to an atrocity almost 
beyond comprehension. Director 
Spielberg's decision to override the 
wishes of Universal Studio executives 
and strive for a documentary look to 
Schindler's List gives his picture a feel of 
history captured in progress. 
Cinematographer Janusz Kaminski's 
icy black and white images appropri-
ately suggest the lowest reaches of 
hell. Steven Zaillian's screenplay shows 
us the good that can be done even by 
unheroic men when they respond to 
the dicta.tes of conscience. Liam 
Neeson's lead performance never 
frames Schindler with an icon's halo, 
but always keeps a fundamental ambi-
guity at the center of his character. 
And Ben Kingsley's work as Stern 
underscores the critical extent to 
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which Jews were vitally involved in 
their own survival. 
One hopes that Schindler's List 
finally silences those petty naysayers 
who have derided Steven Spielberg 
despite such masterworks as E. T. and 
Empire of the Sun. From the religious 
candle at the opening which burns out 
and dissolves into the smoke of the 
Nazi ovens, to the director himself 
standing vigil by Schindler's grave at 
the end, this is haunting filmmaking. 
The light of world Judaism flickered in 
the winds of Nazi bigotry. But it did 
not go out. Oskar Schindler is one of 
the people who shielded the flame 
from the ovens' snuff. Steven 
Spielberg keeps it alive today through 
the artistry of his filmmaking craft. 
In the nascent years of the film 
medium, D.W. Griffith realized the 
special power of cinema to communi-
cate with the masses. Woodrow Wilson 
called Griffith's classic The Birth of a 
Nation "history written in lightning." 
But Griffith's epic tale of the Civil War 
and Reconstruction is anything but 
history. Even today it remains a daz-
zling instance of filmmaking, but it's 
also an egregious exercise in bigotry 
which makes heroes of Ku Klux Klan 
nightriders and villains of the freed 
slaves. By the time Hitler was launch-
ing his blitzkrieg across the plains of 
Europe he had a skilled filmmaker in 
his diabolical service. Leni 
Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will makes 
Nazism look self-sacrificing, glam-
orous and thrilling. 
In the pages of this publication 
and elsewhere I have confessed my 
concern about the power of cinema to 
misinform, misconstrue and mislead. 
A work like Oliver Stone's execrable 
JFK takes deliberate liberties with fact 
in order to promote a paranoid thesis. 
And yet for thousands, maybe millions, 
Stone's conspiracy theories aboutJohn 
Kennedy's assassination become the 
popular understanding of fact. That's 
why I was so hard on Alan Parker's 
mostly well-meaning Mississippi 
Burning. In service to his story about 
the 1964 murders of three civil-rights 
workers, Parker makes heroes of the 
FBI and passive victims of the movie's 
black characters. Since J. Edgar 
Hoover's FBI was anything but an 
agent of social change, and since the 
legacy of the civil-rights movement was 
one of activism and profound courage, 
I complained loudly at the release of 
Mississippi Burning in 1989 that Parker 
was forging a popular history that was 
diametrically wrong. 
Historical purists might fault 
Spielberg on these grounds, I sup-
pose. Keneally has complained pub-
licly about a fictional development 
near the end of Schindler's List. As the 
war in Europe is about to end, 
Schindler gathers his Jewish employees 
about him and informs that soon they 
will be free. His own fate, he explains, 
will be more problematical. He is a 
member of the Nazi party, after all, 
and he has run war industries utilizing 
slave labor. As the Jews prepare for lib-
erty, Schindler must go into hiding. 
Then at the time of his departure, he 
breaks down, lamenting that he has 
saved even a farthing for himself, 
because with a fine suit of clothes or a 
gold pin or a luxury automobile, addi-
tional lives might have been snatched 
from the gas chambers. In fact, 
Schindler made no such speech, 
engaged in no public second guessing 
of himself whatsoever, and hurried 
away into the night in a car laden with 
jewels. Spielberg has explained that at 
the end of his picture Schindler speaks 
for all of surviving humanity and that 
the variance with fact is in that way 
defensible. I shall not bother to 
engage the director on this point save 
to credit him with elsewhere having 
fully established the complexities of 
Oskar Schindler's odd journey to hero-
ism. I should note, however, that in 
emotional terms the closing twenty 
minutes of Schindler's List do not 
require Schindler's fictionalized 
speech to develop the greatest impact 
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I have ever encountered at a motion 
picture. 
In most every other regard 
Spielberg has indeed written history 
in lightning. There are a score or 
more of unforgettable scenes. Among 
them in the early going is the casual 
torment of a Jewish student who is 
cornered by storm trooper thugs on a 
Krakow street. The Jew hasn't done 
anything. He represents no threat. He 
is harassed and humiliated because he 
can be, because the society in which 
he finds himself has silenced all voices 
who might speak out for fundamental 
human decency. This is a society which 
has encouraged hate to the extent 
that we see a pretty eight-year-old 
blond German girl with her face 
screwed up into a venomous mask, 
cursing and spitting at distraught 
Jewish families being herded from 
their homes with only such possessions 
as they can carry into the holding pen 
at Podgorze. In a series of scenes we 
witness the mad illogic of the Nazi 
mind. Stern has long been recognized 
for his superb organizational abilities, 
by Schindler, of course, but by Goeth 
and other Nazis as well. So as the "final 
solution" is being prepared, Stern is 
placed in charge of the mobilization. 
He's to maintain proper records , 
arrange the rail transportation and 
relocate every Jew in Poland to a death 
camp. Stern is invaluable, but he 's a 
Jew. And so he must reserve a place 
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on the last train to Auschwitz for him-
self. 
A repeated motif in Schindler's 
List is the stubborn hope of the incar-
cerated Jews which manifests itself in 
sad self-delusion. Surely the Nazis 
won't do anything other than steal 
their homes and crowd them into a 
ghetto. Surely the Nazis have done 
their worst by establishing slave camps 
like that at Plaszow. Surely the Nazis 
wouldn't undermine their own war 
effort by squandering the advantage 
of free Jewish labor. Surely the rumors 
about gas chambers aren't true. The 
incarcerated Jews deceive themselves 
in part because the alternative is 
despair. But we must rid ourselves of 
such deceptions today. We must look 
the truth in its sometimes ugly face. 
Racism possesses the power to turn 
men into monsters. Racism stands ever 
ready to alchemize atrocity into jus-
tice. 
Late in the film the women at 
Plaszow try to prepare themselves for 
the latest purge which will send many 
in their midst to the gas chambers. 
New Jewish slaves are arriving from 
Yugoslavia and space must be created. 
Goeth orders that the sick, aged and 
weak shall be culled out and sent to 
the ovens at Auschwitz . Huddled 
together in their dark, cramped bar-
racks, the starving, panicked women 
try to make themselves look healthy 
and strong. They brush their hair and 
bite their lips in hopes of adding 
color. Finally, they prick their fingers 
to rouge their cheeks, shed their own 
blood in a desperate bid for life. In a 
subsequent scene, holding their flimsy 
clothes in a bundle before them, 
naked Jews are run past a row of tables 
where white-smocked Nazi "doctors" 
sit "evaluating" their health. Playing 
like a scene out of Caligula's Rome, 
the "doctors" arbitrarily direct these 
runners into two separate lines. Those 
in one line will live another day; those 
in the other will be murdered Imme-
diately. 
In countless scenes like these , 
Spielberg depicts the Holocaust's 
unspeakable horror. And yet Schindler's 
List is finally a story about life, not 
death, about hope, not despair. Its 
end is a catharsis. For whatever murky 
reasons arising from his opaque soul, 
Schindler accomplished the impossi-
ble. Twelve hundred people survived 
in his sanctuary. A half century later 
the heirs of the Schindlerjuden exceed 
6,000 in number while in all of con-
temporary Poland there are fewer 
than 4,000 Jews. This is the history les-
son of Schindler's List. the Holocaust 
was; the Jews are. We must learn the 
lesson of the Holocaust. We must 
never forget the long nightmare of 
Europe's Jews lest those who hate 
should some day prevail. This is 
Spielberg's triumph: viewers of 
Schindler's List will remember. 0 
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The Ice Machine is Frozen, 
and Other Paradoxes of Mid-
Winter 
Arvid F. Sponberg 
The Ice Machine Is Frozen 
Martin Luther King Day comes 
amid the Great Cold Snap of 1994, the 
same day that Bobby Ray Inman with-
draws from his nomination as 
Secretary of Defense., and the universi-
ty's men's basketball team posts an 
unprecedented fourth victory in con-
ference play. At the end of the day, 
there is a lot to be thankful for. 
In the morning, I hear the fine 
address of Dr. Bernard Lafayette, a col-
league of Dr. King's whose warm 
inflections, phrases, and recollections 
project the ideals of Dr. King into the 
future. Afterwards, as I walk out of the 
Gus Sponberg, of the Department of 
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chapel my shoulders involutarily 
hunch around my ears. The cold 
carves through my coat, trousers, long 
underwear and begins to pare the skin 
from my thighs. 
On Monday night , Walt 
Wangerin calls to ask if it is true that 
classes have been canceled. Walt has 
just driven home from Indianapolis 
and he is a man who finds inspiration 
on walks in the woods at night when it 
is 20 below zero. He comes from 
North Dakota and longs to live in 
Alaska. Classes have indeed been can-
celed for only the second time in twen-
ty-two years. As we talk, I check the 
thermometer outside my kitchen win-
dow: 23 below. Walt remains skeptical. 
Wednesday is just as cold as 
Tuesday, but classes are back in ses-
sion. At 11:50 I start a class. At 11:55 
the lights go out. We wait in the gloom 
for ten minutes. I know the lights 
won't be back on for hours. I feel it. I 
dismiss class. My students head out of 
the building. I gather up books and 
papers, shove them into my brief case, 
and reassemble my arctic armor. As I 
leave the building, the lights come on. 
I head to the union for lunch. In 
the cafeteria line, I hear one of the 
cashiers say, 'There is no ice. The ice 
machine is frozen." 
Keeping Silent During the Execution 
On Martin Luther King Day, I 
attend a forum on the question, 
Should English Be Made the Official 
Language of the United States? I 
remain puzzled why the proposal to 
make English the official language 
attracts any support. A nation of immi-
grants would be, you would think, 
proudly multi-lingual. It would be 
supremely skilled in the arts of transla-
tion. Its children would regard it as 
"cool" to speak three or four languages 
by the time they graduated from high 
school. Apparently the yearning to 
leave the old world behind remains so 
strong in some American hearts that it 
can be assuaged only by legislation 
that silences all other tongues. The 
announced aim of such legislation is 
unity and social solidarity. But there 
are other kinds of unity. 
The unity of an orchestra is of a 
different kind. It requires the silence 
of the leader so that each voice can 
blend with the others and yet be dis-
tinctly heard . Dennis Friesen-Carper 
conducts orchestras and choruses. In 
conversation with him one day recent-
ly, the topic of trusting others rises for 
consideration. Dennis says that the 
trust of the conductor by the musi-
cians must be extraordinary. He says 
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that the trust depends not only on the 
players' respect for the conductor's 
musicianship, but also on their under-
standing of the conductor's concept of 
how any particular work should sound. 
During the perfor~ance of this con-
cept the conductor remains silent. 
Think of this: you have a clear 
idea of how something should be 
done-but the only way to produce 
the desired result requires you to keep 
silent during the execution. 
Maybe speakers of English could 
create social solidarity more effectively 
by keeping silent from time to time 
and listening for the harmonies of the 
voices around them. 
Making Space 
The craft of acting is full of para-
doxes. The stage whisper is an exam-
ple. Another is "blocking" a play. This 
does not mean stopping a play from 
occurring. It means carefully arrang-
ing the movements· and positions of 
actors so that the overall effect appears 
unforced and natural. Often, depend-
ing upon the size of the cast and of the 
stage, the more natural you want the 
play to look, the more precise and 
complicated the blocking may 
become. 
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Consider the fact that the en tire 
art depends on memory of both block-
ing and words. The object is to have 
done the the lines and movements so 
many times that you can, at any and 
every performance, create the illusion 
that you are doing them for the first 
time. 
On January 21st, these and relat-
ed thoughts entered and exited my 
mind as I watched Philip Edward Van 
Lear "work the room," which, in this 
case, belonged to Julian Brown's class 
in American Minority Theater. Mr. 
Van Lear earns his living as a profes-
sional actor and director in Chicago. 
Currently, he is assistant director on 
"The African Company Presents 
Richard III" which opened in late 
February for a limited run at the 
Illinois Theatre Centre in Park Forest. 
There were about twelve of us in 
Mr. Van Lear's aura for almost two 
hours. He instructed us in many parts 
of the actor's craft. Though he spoke, 
he also moved. He used the entire area 
available to him. He advanced upon us 
and retreated. He strode-he swag-
gered-he skimmed-he swooped. He 
extended himself into every cubic inch 
of space, probing the contents of the 
ether for the ineluctable strands of 
confluence between his mind and 
heart and ours. And in this movement, 
this dance of instruction, he carried us 
into the region of his art that remains 
forever just out of reach of words. 
To the actor it often seems as if 
other artists have not an easier time, 
exactly, but an advantage in being able 
to go to their work with fewer encum-
brances. The painter seems to go 
directly to the canvas. The musician 
seems to need only to touch the key-
board or raise the horn to her lips. But 
an actor solitary in a studio is barely an 
actor. In the theater there seems to be 
so much more to arrange before the 
work can begin. Just making the space 
to do the work becomes an accom-
plishement. 
Mr. Van Lear is a talented and 
persevering actor and so he works fre-
quently. But actors never know for cer-
tain when they will work again. And so 
Mr. Van Lear "worked" on us. He 
acted the part of an actor instructing a 
class in the art of acting. For me it was 
thrilling to witness the performance 
and I hope it was not the last time that 
we will see Mr. Van Lear on our 
stages-excuse me-in our classrooms. 
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Greatness 
Arthur Ashe and Arnold Rampersand. 
Days of Grace: A Memoir. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. 
Roughly half way through Arthur 
Ashe's memoirs, Days of Grace, which 
were composed in the last year of his 
life and, indeed, bring us almost to the 
moment of his death, we are offered a 
chapter entitled "The Burden of 
Race ." The issue of Ashe's race has 
not been absent from the book until 
now, but it has been muted and inci-
dental to other concerns. Describing 
the public response to his announce-
ment of having contracted AIDS, he 
writes, "race and politics crossing 
medicine and disease. One card I 
received called me "an inspiration to 
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many people during your career. .. It 
was signed: 'A white family in 
Mississippi'" (30). Attempting to deal 
with the onset of retirement from ten-
nis, he draws on W.E.B. DuBois for wis-
dom. He refers to his friendship with 
prominent African Americans like 
Andrew Young, who married Ashe and 
h is wife Jeanne, and David Dinkins. 
The second chapter tantalizes with its 
title, "Middle Passage." This could 
well be a reference to the Middle 
Passage of slave ships and the triangu-
lar trade between Europe, Africa, and 
the Americas and hence to his identity 
as an African American. But the chap-
ter turns out to deal with passage to 
middle life involving very different 
kinds of questions about identity. The 
fourth chapter takes up his involve-
ment in protest and politics, and his 
crusade against apartheid in South 
Africa. The chosen cause tips the 
hand and yet even here the issue of his 
African American identity remains 
more an undercurrent than a subject 
of meditation . Then comes the fifth 
chapter whose title I have already men-
tioned and its opening is absolutely 
startling, especially when it comes 
from a man who is very measured in 
his comments and who has so carefully 
avoided extremes and hyperbole. 
He is being interviewed by a 
reporter from People magazine about 
how he is coping with AIDS. She asks, 
"I guess this must be the heaviest bur-
den you have ever had to bear, isn't 
it?" Ashe responds, "No it isn't. It's a 
burden all right ... but being black is 
the greatest burden I have had to 
bear" (126). How could this be? AIDS 
will kill Ashe. On the other hand, 
despite the burden of race, Ashe is 
affluent, highy regarded, a national 
celebrity, a man whose life is a triumph 
by most standards by which we mea-
sure success. When the reporter has 
trouble believing what Ashe has said, 
Ashe elaborates: "My disease is the 
result of biological factors over which 
we, thus far, have had no control. 
Racism, however, is entirely made by 
people, and therefore it hurts and 
inconveniences more" (126-27). He 
speaks of the "pall of sadness" that 
hangs over the lives of all African 
Americans, whether they are 
Wimbledon champions or welfare 
recipients trapped in the inner city. 
The sadness stems not only from what 
the blacks have "experienced histori-
cally," but also from "what we as indi-
viduals experience each and every day" 
( 127). 
The Thirteenth Amendment, rat-
ified in December, 1865, guaranteed 
legal emancipation to all African 
Americans in the United States. As we 
know, emancipation did not bring 
equality. Rules and principles of law 
and justice do not always, or easily, 
translate into experiential reality. One 
hundred and twenty eight years after 
emancipation and roughly three 
decades after the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, the transition from slavery to full 
citizenship has yet to take place for 
even the top level of African 
Americans. That is, if full citizenship 
is to be defined as equal opportunity 
for self-development and freedom 
from constraints and offenses of 
racism, then for African Americans-
even African Americans like Ashe, who 
are integrated into the American 
mainstream, have flourished economi-
cally and socially, and who have loved 
America-America is yet to offer this 
full citizenship, yet to love them back. 
A cover story in the Newsweek of 
November 15, 1993, focused on the 
hidden anger of middle class blacks. A 
recent book by Ellis Cose, also excerpt-
ed in the November 15 issue of 
Newsweek, dwells more fully on the 
same phenomenon. In The Rage of a 
Privileged Class, Cose argues that pro-
fessionally successful African 
Americans, who share the prevailing 
mores of the white middle class in 
terms of belief in Jaw and order and in 
the virtues of hard work, continue to 
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feel angry because they continue to 
suffer the pricks of racism, and that 
these affronts to self-worth, slight 
though they may seem, wound the very 
souls of middle class African 
Americans. Many whites, even liberals, 
may find this anger unjustified. In the 
many debates I have heard on this 
issue, the claims of progress made by 
blacks always loom large. 
These claims are undeniable 
and, in most instances, accepted by 
African Americans. Here is a summary 
of the political gains made in recent 
years that appears in a recent textbook 
written by African Americans: "In 
1992 nearly eight thousand of all elect-
ed officials in the United states were 
blacks. The Congress of 1993 had thir-
ty-nine Afro-American members, and 
the first Cabinet of the Clinton admin-
istration contained four blacks. In 
addition, thousands of Afro-Americans 
have sat on city and county councils 
and in state legislatures. Many blacks 
have also served as mayors of the 
nation's largest cities ... Blacks have 
gained seats in state courts, including 
several state supreme courts, and have 
increasingly served in the federal judi-
ciary. Remarkably, two blacks have 
filled seats on the US. Supreme Court. 
They have sat at the highest levels in 
the federal executive departments" 
(Africans in the Americas 277). 
But the middle class blacks claim, 
and rightly so, that despite these gains, 
the national culture continues to be 
racist. Cose offers numerous exam-
ples. He interviews executives who, 
despite praise for their work and 
despite all their intelligence and hard 
work, find themselves blocked from 
achieving top positions. Others find 
themselves pigeonholed into what are 
considered black jobs which are typi-
cally jobs in community service, public 
affairs, or jobs which require working 
with other blacks or minorities. Even 
the most successful blacks find them-
selves unable to gain access to certain 
residential areas or to exclusive private 
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clubs. Cose records the seething 
anger of a black lawyer, a partner in an 
elite firm and "normally [a] restrained 
and unfailingly gracious man" (56). 
The lawyer tells of an incident of few 
days earlier. He arrives early in his 
office building and travels up the ele-
vator with a young white man. When 
they arrive at the office doors, the 
senior lawyer finds his way barred by 
the young man and can only enter 
after barking out his name which iden-
tifies him as a senior partner. The 
lawyer reflects: "After all, he had been 
dressed much better than the associ-
ate. His clients paid the younger 
man's salary. The only thing that 
could have conceivably stirred the 
associate's suspicions was race: 
'Because of his color, he felt he had 
the right to check me out'" (Cose 56). 
These are not imagined slights of 
people who carry chips on their shoul-
ders, and I have evidence for this 
much closer to home. After graduat-
ing from Jaw school, and despite the 
fact that he was more qualified than 
most, my African American husband 
could only find his first job working 
with a black lawyer in Gary. The much 
debated affirmative action plans which 
have supposedly made it so easy for 
qualified African Americans to find 
jobs function, for whatever they are 
worth, in big firms and in big cities 
and not in the predominantly white 
suburban town in which we live. In 
another job search, a would-be 
employer told my husband quite can-
didly that he could only hire him after 
ascertaining from his major clients 
whether they would be willing to work 
with an African American. In fact, this 
employment had to be cleared with 
the office secretary as well who was 
known to be mildly racist and who had 
worked for a long time in the office 
and now was viewed as indispensable. 
A young partner, a friend of my hus-
band and far from being a bigot, once 
made a demeaning remark about 
blacks. When my husband pointed out 
that he was black, the friend's 
response, offered as a compliment, was 
in fact even more galling: "Oh! I don't 
see you as black." 
How does one live with these 
constant slights? How does one sur-
vive with dignity and self-confidence 
intact? Many don't. "Even those who 
refuse to internalize the expectation of 
failure are often left with nagging 
doubts, with a feeling, as journalist 
Joseph Boyce puts it, 'that no matter 
what you do in life, there are very few 
venues in which you can really be sure 
that you've exhausted your potential. 
Your achievement is defined by your 
color and its limitation' " (Cose 58). 
Those who survive do so by employing 
several strategies, chief among which is 
the suppression of anger. My husband 
did eventually work with the candid 
boss who had to check with his clients 
before offering a job. He has learned 
to smile, to shrug his shoulders and to 
carry on. He and others have no use 
for whining but they have also learned 
that self-control and self-suppression 
are absolutely necessary to meet the 
rather tough standards, much more 
tough for blacks than for whites, by 
which they are seen to fit in, to belong 
to an institution, a corporation, a busi-
ness. 
While there are groups of 
African Americans who overuse the 
rhetoric of victimization and who 
ascribe all failures to race, they in no 
way represent the majority or find 
favor among the educated blacks. 
Thus, claims that the verdict against 
Mike Tyson was inspired by racism or 
that racism accounts for the unneces-
sary alacrity with which the press is 
hounding Michael Jackson find little 
support even among those middle 
class and professional blacks who 
speak of the permanence of racism in 
our society and suffer the pricks of 
racism in their daily lives. In his mem-
oirs, Ashe discusses the prevalence of 
conspiracy theories among African 
Americans in connection with the 
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spread and treatment of AIDS. He will 
not subscribe to the theory that AIDS 
was created in the laboratory for pur-
poses of genocide. He takes up the 
question of Kemron, the drug devel-
oped in Kenya for which great claims 
have been advanced, and whose lack 
of acceptance by the American medi-
cal establishment has been blamed on 
racism. Ashe writes, "I myself don't 
have to be convinced that Europeans 
are skeptical about scientific claims by 
Africans ... But I am not going to 
ingest a drug simply to show support 
for the notion that science can flourish 
in Africa" (133). He wants proof and 
when he does not find the proof, he 
leaves Kemron alone. 
Coming from Arthur Ashe, as 
sane a man any we have had on the 
public scene, his dissection of how 
racism distorts the fabric of American 
life, particularly the fabric of the life of 
African Americans, carries special 
weight and credibility. He says that he 
is "almost always aware of race, alert to 
its power as an idea, sensitive to its 
nuances in the world. Like many other 
blacks, when I find myself in a new 
public situation, I will count ... the 
number of black and brown faces pre-
sent, especially to see how many, if 
any, are employed by the hosts" (131). 
He wonders if he is hypersensitive but 
recognizes that even this hypersensitiv-
ity is a distortion caused by the effect 
of racism. He is attending a benefit 
match for the Arthur Ashe Foundation 
for the defeat of AIDS with his family 
and sitting in the box with him are 
Stan Smith and his family. Smith's 
daughter has brought along twin 
blond dolls, and pre sen ted one to 
Camera, Ashe's daughter. Suddenly 
Ashe freezes at the · thought that the 
cameras will show Camera playing with 
a blond doll and thus invite criticism 
from the black community. He 
arranges for the doll to be taken away 
and then regrets the action as a vio-
lence against the innocence of his 
child. He concludes that racism has so 
sullied the fabric of our lives that now 
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hypocrisy and defensiveness are our 
instinctive responses ( 130). 
However successful, however self-
confident, Ashe feels that he will 
always remain marked by the shadow 
of race, a shadow so uneradicable that 
"only death will free me, and blacks 
like me, from its pall" (128). Ashe 
speaks of other ways that the shadow 
of race has affected his behavior, his 
very character and in his description 
we recognize the strategies of survival I 
have mentioned earlier. He says that 
he became " a master at the game that 
all African Americans must learn if 
they wish to preserve their sanity," if 
they wish to live with some dignity. "I 
learned not so much to turn the other 
cheek as to present ... no cheek at all. 
I learned to give no opportunity for a 
bigot to pounce on and exploit. I 
learned in moments of humiliation to 
walk away with what was left of my dig-
nity, rather than to lose it all in an 
explosion of rage" (138). 
As Ashe analyzes his character 
and considers his strengths and weak-
nesses, he also dissects the various 
forces which have shaped him. He 
knows that he is considered cool and 
even cold. The byline on a cover story 
on him in Life reads, "The Icy 
Elegance of Arthur Ashe" (50). He 
admits that he can be detached and 
certainly he is a rationalist who careful-
ly analyzes the situation. During his 
captaincy of the Davis Cup team, he is 
blamed by some of his players for not 
been sufficiently involved in the game. 
McEnroe, for instance, "complained 
about Ashe's demeanor, which he 
found too placid" (80). While Ashe is 
proud of his record as captain of the 
Davis Cup team, he admits that he 
would have been more effective if he 
had been more aggressive and if he 
had imposed his will on the volatile 
McEnroe or the irascible Connors 
(99). Partly Ashe's "placid" behavior is 
rooted in his more "correct" standards 
of behavior which will not allow him to 
accept the bad temper of these players 
on the court or their use of foul Ian-
guage. In tennis, Ashe seems to 
belong almost to a different genera-
tion than players like McEnroe and 
Connors, although the age difference 
is not significant. Certainly, he was 
viewed by others and by himself as 
being old-fashioned. Ashe was always 
the perfect gentleman on court, the 
player with exceptional grace and 
courtesy. But the placid behavior has 
other roots as well. He speculates, for 
instance, that part of his reticence of 
behavior may have to do with 
repressed feelings resulting from the 
early death of his mother (50). 
However, more than anything 
else, this self-control, this absolutely 
correct behavior is a very deliberately 
cultivated grace. It is a grace born of 
enormous self-discipline which is 
required of African Americans if they 
are to succeed in the white world, cer-
tainly the white-dominated world of 
tennis. He has been taught by his 
black mentors to be "unfailingly polite 
on the court, unfalteringly calm and 
detached, so that whites could never 
accuse me of meanness" (110). This 
wariness born of the burden of race 
becomes with Ashe a gift of grace. It 
shapes his conduct in all arenas of his 
life. It spurs him to find higher sanc-
tions for his life than those available to 
a professional athlete. He seeks that 
benediction in life which comes from 
high seriousness and moral purpose. 
On retiring from the life of profession-
al tennis he desires a life of commit-
ment to humanity: "I wanted to make a 
difference, however small, in the 
world, and I wanted to do so in a use-
ful and honorable way" (43). Since he 
cannot dedicate his talents to simply 
making money, his early retirement 
becomes an opportunity to accomplish 
something worthy. He wishes to teach 
at a college, and will do so later choos-
ing a historically black college as 
against offers from an Ivy League. 
Ashe's anti-apartheid crusade is , in 
some measure as he himself recog-
nizes, an attempt to make up for his 
relative inaction during the civil rights 
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struggle (112). In most instances, race 
defines the causes he chooses. And in 
each instance, for Ashe the politics of 
protest must have a high moral pur-
pose. 
The black underclasses are on 
fire in the inner cities. Black on black 
violence is destroying a generation of 
youth. Black leadership has not been 
particularly effective in dealing with 
black issues. There is, of course, Jesse 
Jackson, whom Ashe characterizes as a 
man who likes the limelight too much 
and set out to become "the Minister 
Plenipotentiary from black America to 
the world" (159). Like Ashe, most of 
the black middle class still admires 
him but questions his capacity to be an 
effective leader. In Ashe's memoirs we 
hear the voice of a considerable sec-
tion of the black middle class. Fully 
aware of the manner in which this 
nation's racism has contributed to the 
simmering violence of the black 
underclass, they nevertheless want to 
eschew the rhetoric of blame of the 
enemy for the rhetoric of responsibili-
ty. 
Ashe's stance is perhaps a little 
more conservative than is typical of 
this group although not as conserva-
tive as that of Clarence Thomas or of 
the columnist Thomas Sowells, who 
are emblems of black voices most 
acceptable to the establishment, and 
who, as Sowells has, become darlings 
of the media and annointed pundits 
on issues of race. I am sure Thomas 
would have also achieved this status 
but for being tainted by sexual harrass-
ment charges. Unlike these others, 
Ashe's fundamental insights are 
shared by most African Americans, 
especially among the middle class. He 
decries the irrationality fostered by 
leaders like Sharpton and by a certain 
class of black media like the radio sta-
tion \\'LIB of New York, although even 
here he remains sympathetic to the 
points of view of many callers, sensing 
"the hurt and sorrow behind the wild 
accusations" (158). For Ashe, favors 
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and rewards must be earned. He does 
not believe that they are owed. 
Mrican Americans need help to reach 
the point where they can begin to ben-
efit from education, but they too must 
put in the effort. 
Ashe's stance on affirmative 
action is modulated by self-pride, by 
his conviction that with equal opportu-
nity blacks can achieve as much as 
members of any other race, and by his 
acute awareness that affirmative action 
brings suspicions about blacks who are 
now hired. Well-qualified blacks, 
when hired under affirmative action 
plans, find themselves being looked 
down upon as not fully qualified for 
the job. "What I and others want, 
writes Ashe, "is an equal chance, under 
one set of rules, as on a tennis court" 
(153). He knows, however, that even 
when equal opportunity is promised, it 
is not always available, and hence there 
is justification for adjustments like 
affirmative action. "To be sure, while 
rules are different for different people, 
devices like affirmative action are ... 
probably necessary" (153). 
Ashe's lament on the breakdown 
of family values, on the lack of morali-
ty among the young, identifies him at 
one moment with Dan Quayle (160). 
But now that Bill Clinton has also 
acknowledged the merit of Quayle's 
criticism in this one instance, we can 
see the possibility of separating pro-
gressive politics from the language of 
social determinism to which it had 
become wedded, a language which 
focused exclusively on victimization 
and hence tended to absolve the indi-
vidual of responsibility. In the context 
of African American lives, Ashe is 
sending a message we have not heard 
for a while: Even as Mrican Americans 
battle the racism so deeply embedded 
in American culture, so often institu-
tionalized in the structures of 
American society, they must also help 
themselves through means that seem 
to have become discredited after the 
civil rights era-education, electoral 
politics, moral authority. This was 
Ashe's belief. His life as he lived it and 
as it is rendered in Days of Grace is a 
beacon in that direction. 
RenuJuneja 
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